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Abstract
Modern power systems are continuously developing into large and interconnected ones.
However, at the same time, restructuring within the power industry and reduced invest-
ment in transmission system expansions mean that power systems are operating closer
and closer to their limits, leaving them more vulnerable to fault outages than before. The
aspects of protection and control within power systems have thus become increasingly im-
portant as well as complicated. Concurrently, the continuous technological development in
communication and measurement has accelerated the occurrence and application of Wide-
Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC), a new kind of advanced scheme
based on wide-area measurements. The blackouts happened in North America as well as
in other countries over the past few years are also providing more incentives to scientists
and engineers to study wide-area protection and control systems. Communication networks
in smart grids bring increased connectivity at the cost of increased security vulnerabilities
and challenges. A smart grid can be a prime target for cyber terrorism because of its criti-
cal nature. As a result, smart grid security has already attracted significant attention from
governments, the energy industry, and consumers, leading to several important studies.
WAMPAC is the concept of using system-wide information via a centralized control
center or Energy Management System (EMS) to monitor and control the whole system.
Based on the situation and the required control action, the control center shares selected
data with specific remote locations that are in need of the data. The utilization of system-
wide information makes it easier to monitor the entire system and make better control and
protection decisions by the EMS. Although the communication system is the backbone of
these recent schemes, it makes them vulnerable to different types of cyber attacks. This
thesis aims to investigate the problem of cyber security in frequency-related WAMPAC
schemes. Two main schemes are considered as case studies: Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) and Wide-Area Under-Frequency Load Shedding (WAUFLS) protection schemes.
In addition, the cyber security of Power System State Estimation (PSSE), as a Wide-Area
Monitoring (WAM) scheme, has been revisited. As WAMPAC schemes are so varied in
their purpose and implementation, there is no general analysis to illustrate the potential
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impact of a cyber attack on all such schemes. However, some general types of system
responses are considered in this work.
First, with regard to AGC systems, a Kalman filter-based approach is proposed to de-
tect False Data Injection (FDI) in AGC systems. Because detecting FDI and removing the
compromised measurements are not enough in practical situations, the use of a simulta-
neous input and state estimation-based algorithm to detect and concurrently compensate
for FDI attacks against the measurements of AGC systems is investigated. Throughout
the use of this algorithm, the FDI attack signal is dealt with as an unknown input and
its value is estimated accordingly. Then, the estimated value for the FDI is used to com-
pensate for the effect of the attack so that the control center makes its decisions based on
the corrected sensor signals, not the manipulated ones. Unlike other approaches, and as
an extension to this work, the effect of AGC nonlinearities is studied during the attack
time. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)-based approach is proposed to detect FDI during
a time where any of the nonlinearities is affecting the system. The RNN-based approach
is used to classify and identify the attacks according to their behavior.
Second, with regard to WAUFLS protection schemes, this thesis investigates the prob-
lem of cyber attacks on WAUFLS. This is followed by a detailed analysis showing that an
adversary can launch an FDI attack against existing WAUFLS schemes in three different
ways depending on they access level to system data, which may lead to equipment damage
and/or system-wide blackout. To address this issue, a new mitigation scheme, that is ro-
bust against cyber attacks, is proposed to mitigate the effect of FDI attacks on WAUFLS.
The proposed scheme depends on trusted system states to run power flow, so the power
mismatch in the system is calculated. Finally, the calculated magnitude of disturbance is
used to decide on the amount and locations of the load shedding.
All proposed detection and mitigation methods in the thesis are tested using simulations
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The electric power grid is one of the most complex engineering machines ever built by
humans. It is a highly interdependent cyber-physical system, where the dynamics of one
system are tightly coupled to those of another. The latest smart grids contain a large
number of interconnected areas, each of which has its own generators, loads and local
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
System data are collected from Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs), integrated remote substations, and local SCADA systems under a frame-
work of standard communication protocols such as IEC-60870 and IEC-61850. These
data are exchanged over a Wide Area Network (WAN) via an Inter-utility Control Center
Communication Protocol (ICCP). The SCADA/EMS efficiently uses IEDs for performing
remote monitoring and control actions. The IEDs, as monitoring and control interfaces to
the power system equipment, are installed in remote site/substation control centers and
can be integrated using suitable communication networks. The IEDs and local commu-
nication can be locally accessed over a Local Area Network (LAN), while the remote site
control center is connected to the SCADA/EMS and other engineering systems through
the power system WAN [2].
WAMPAC utilizes system-wide information and sends selected data to specific remote
locations. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), driven by the Global Positioning System
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(GPS), provide real-time synchrophasor measurements for voltage and current phasors
throughout the grid. These measurements offer real-time visibility to the dynamics of
the power system that complement traditional SCADA measurements. Synchrophasor
networks can give significant advantages by providing fast and precise measurements that
can be reported at rates as high as 60 times per second [3]. This is mainly because
SCADA measurements, in Wide-Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS), are unable to provide
a timely assessment of the system due to low sampling rates as well as a lack of time
synchronization [4].
Recently, and due to the availability of PMU measurements, WAMPAC is being used
in different applications. These applications include PSSE, AGC, real-time contingency
analysis, Remedial Action Schemes (RAS), security constrained optimal power flow, eco-
nomic dispatch, unit commitment, phase angle monitoring, power oscillation monitoring,
power damping monitoring, voltage stability monitoring, and dynamic line rating [5]. The
common remedial actions against wide-area disturbances are generator rejection, load re-
jection, Under-Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) schemes, Out-of-Step (OOS) relaying,
Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) schemes, etc.
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
Traditionally, SCADA systems were not built with security as an important design
criterion. The exposure of SCADA network infrastructure to cyber threats has thus in-
creased enormously due to the enhanced interconnectivity of SCADA and public network
infrastructures. Over the past decade, the power grid’s SCADA and several other Crit-
ical Infrastructures (CI) such as banking, water distribution, oil and natural gas, smart
grids, etc., are increasingly being targeted by advanced, sophisticated adversaries, as these
infrastructures are critical to national security and societal well-being [6–8]. Therefore,
the data being transmitted in the communication system represent an attractive target
for attackers, increasing the vulnerability of these critical systems [9]. In smart grids,
the common types of cyber attacks are smart grid Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, timing
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de-synchronization attacks, malware attacks, and FDI and manipulation attacks [10,11].
A recent example of malware that targets Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is Win32/
Industroyer, which is a sophisticated malware designed to disrupt the working processes
of ICS used in electrical substations. Other examples include Stuxnet, which struck an
Iranian nuclear facility in 2010 [12, 13], and the attack against Ukraine’s power system
in December 2015. In the latter incident, the attackers were able to install a malware
called BlackEnergy on the control center computers of three energy distribution companies
in Ukraine and temporarily disrupt the electricity supply to the end consumers, which
resulted in thousands of homes and facilities suffering a power outage for several days [14].
This cyber attack showed the inadequacy of relying on just infrastructure- based traditional
cyber security measures when dealing with a resourceful and sophisticated adversary. The
adversary was able to steal valid credentials through social engineering to get into the
control network and perform reconnaissance and planning for several months. These types
of incidents, similar in nature to insider threats, highlight the need to go beyond a single
layer of security in order to detect and quickly recover from a sophisticated cyber attack.
The need to develop intelligent countermeasures in multiple layers, to secure SCADA
infrastructure elements and the fundamental applications they support, is being increas-
ingly recognized. Several governmental reports have highlighted various weaknesses in
cyber security for the electric sector that could result in major impacts due to emerging
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and also the urgent need to take measures to protect
them [15]. The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy
Reliability (OE) was set up for the main purpose of overseeing activities that enhance the
reliability and resilience of the nation’s energy infrastructure.
The Cyber security for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program, created by the DOE
OE, has adopted a strategic and hierarchical approach to funding several R&D projects
that specially target multiple domains. Their aim is to develop novel solutions that go
beyond traditional Information Technology (IT) infrastructure-based security to leverage
the physical properties of the grid as part of application layer security [8]. Recognizing
the importance of the cyber security of the Energy Delivery Systems (EDS), the DOE
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OE released a road map in September 2011 to address the issues and concerns relevant to
energy sector cyber security [16]. Also, the OE created the cyber security for the CEDS
program to assist the energy sector asset owners (electric, oil, and gas) by developing cyber
security solutions for energy delivery systems through integrated planning and a focused
R&D effort [17].
The DOE, in coordination with the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) developed a
cyber security Risk Management Process (RMP) for the electric sector that will enable
organizations to proactively manage cyber security risk [18]. Additionally, several efforts,
like NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) [19] and NIST Interagency Report
(NISTIR) 7628 [20], are being made at the national level to ensure that the appropriate
standards and safeguards are put in place to protect the electric power grid from potential
cyber vulnerabilities and threats.
In addition to the above efforts, lots of research efforts are done to assess and address
the problem of cyber attacks in power systems. However, the area of WAMPAC, in general,
has been barely visited. The developers of the current WAMPAC schemes did not consider
the problem of cyber attacks during the design stage, and still use the communication
channels and communication standards that can be attacked. In addition, most of the
approaches that have been proposed recently to tackle this problem are not real-time and
are based on unpractical and/or simplified assumptions.
Among different WAMPAC applications, the cyber security of wide-area frequency-
based schemes have not been given enough consideration in the literature claiming that
power frequency is a global parameter and any attack to frequency measurements can
be easily detected. However, this is not the case for the application that depend on the
frequency variations between different areas in the same power system e.g., AGC and
WAUFLS schemes. There is a lack of research in the area of mitigating cyber attacks
on AGC systems. In addition, the current WAUFLS schemes still depend on traditional
ways on evaluating system disturbance and performing load shedding. Therefore, there
is a need for developing wide-area frequency-based applications that takes the problem of
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cyber security into consideration during the design process of these schemes.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the effect of cyber attacks on WAMPAC
applications, including AGC, PSSE and WAUFLS, and go beyond traditional security so-
lutions, i.e., to develop new real-time attack-detection and mitigation methods for critical
wide-area frequency-related applications. These developed methods leverage both cyber
and physical aspects of the grid. This is in addition to proposing new WAMPAC schemes
that take cyber security issues into consideration.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 presents a thorough literature review of all considered topics in this research.
It also includes a discussion and a list of gaps extracted from previous works.
Chapter 3 investigates in detail the problem of cyber attacks on frequency-related
wide-area applications, including AGC and WAUFLS. In addition, a brief overview of FDI
attacks on PSSE is provided to serve the content of the thesis. An attack model (i.e.,
attacker capabilities as well as possible damage to a power system) and a mathematical
formulation of the problems are presented, and different simulation scenarios that show
the problem are discussed.
Chapter 4 proposes a method using a Kalman filter to detect FDI attacks on AGC
systems. In addition, a simultaneous input and state estimator is utilized to mitigate
the effect of FDI attacks on AGC systems in real time. A linearized AGC model is used
throughout this chapter. System stability after mitigation using the proposed approach is
then studied. Different case studies are carried out to show the accuracy and efficiency of
the proposed approach.
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Chapter 5 proposes detection and mitigation schemes against FDI attacks on AGC
systems considering system nonlinearities. RNN-based approache is proposed as a detection
and identification mean. For mitigation, load forecast is used.
Chapter 6 presents a new WAUFLS protection scheme that is robust against cyber
attacks. The proposed scheme is explained in detail. A practical system is used to test the
scheme, and simulation results are given to show its accuracy, robustness against attacks,
speed, and reliability.




Background and Literature Review
2.1 Cyber-Physical Security of Smart Grids
”The grid” refers to the electric grid, which is a network of generation stations, trans-
mission lines, substations, transformers and more that deliver electricity from the power
plant to the end user. According to the NIST’s conceptual model of a smart grid [21],
what makes a grid ”smart” is the digital technology that allows for two-way communica-
tion between the utility and its customers and the metering along the transmission lines.
Markets, Service Provider, Operations, Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distribution and
Customer are the seven logical domains of a smart grid. The first three deal with data
collection and power management, while the last four deal with power and information
flows in the smart grid. These domains are connected to each other through variety of
communication links that are governed by various communication protocols.
In addition, smart grids have different components and assets, such as power generation,
distribution, consumers, regional control centers, substations, field devices, communication
and networking devices, phase-measuring units, protecting relays, intelligent electronic de-
vices, remote terminal units, human machine interfaces, home appliances, circuit breakers,
log servers, data concentrators, protocol gateways, tap changers, smart meters, etc. All of
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these components are connected in a smart grid to operate, monitor, and control power
flow and measurements.
However, the legacy cyber-security techniques are no longer sufficient to meet the cyber-
security requirements of the smart grid and its assets. For instance, consumers are con-
cerned about their privacy, as their lifestyle could be exposed to malicious users due to
compromised data communication networks. Similarly, Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI), commonly known as smart meters, can be easily compromised; once they are, it
is almost impossible to change their passwords (PINs), as these devices do not have their
own keyboards to change passwords/PINs. Thus, a controller may be needed to deploy
new passwords automatically once a smart meter is compromised. Thus, smart grid sys-
tems have unique features, goals, objectives and challenges when providing a reliable power
supply and robust communications [9].
2.1.1 Security Requirements in Smart Grids
Smart grids present a variety of technical and regulatory challenges for security [22,23].
These challenges include: 1) the complexity and scale of future power systems; 2) tra-
ditional communication vulnerabilities; 3) new communication requirements; 4) trust-
worthiness among all participants (users, protocol, devices, etc.); 5) legacy devices; 6)
heterogeneous technologies and protocols; 7) proprietary systems; and 8) users’ privacy.
To overcome these challenges, a broad range of security properties are required by the
power systems, such as availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, authoriza-
tion, freshness, efficiency, privacy, scalability, adaptability and evolvability, and authentic-
ity [9, 10, 22,24–33]. These requirements can be defined as follows:
Availability: Availability means that the data must be available to the authorized
parties when there is a need for these data, without any security compromise [9, 10, 32,
33]. It ensures that all network resources (e.g., data, bandwidth, equipment, servers) are
always available at all nodes for the authorized parties [24, 27, 29]. The importance of the
availability of data stems from the fact that the cyber layer in power systems manages the
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continuous power flow in the physical layer. Therefore, any data shortage may drive power
system operators to make wrong decisions.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality means that data are disclosed only to authorized
individuals or systems [9,10,27,29,32,33]. Critical data in power system (e.g., meter data)
should be confidential. Meter data are critical because they provide information about
the usage patterns for individual appliances, which can reveal personal activities through
nonintrusive appliance monitoring. For this purpose, meter data should be protected
such that only intended parties can access the information. Price information and control
commands are not critical as long as they are public knowledge. [30].
Integrity: Integrity refers to the assurance that the accuracy and consistency of the
data are maintained. No unauthorized modification, destruction or loss of data goes with-
out being detected [9,10,24,27,29,32,33]. Integrity of price information, meter data, control
commands, and software used in power system substations is critical. For instance, nega-
tive prices injected by an attacker can cause an electricity utilization spike, as numerous
devices would simultaneously turn on to take advantage of the low price. The impact of
attacking the integrity of meter data and control commands is mostly limited to revenue
loss. However, the integrity of software is critical, since compromised software or malware
can control any device and component in the power system [30].
Authorization: Authorization is also known as access control because it makes sure
that the access rights of every entity in the substation are defined for the purposes of
access control [27]. While distinguishing between valid and invalid users for all other
security objectives, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, etc., authorization in relation to access
control restricts the ability to issue commands to the plant control system. Violation of
authorization may cause safety issues [28].
Authentication: Authentication simply refers to verifying the identity of a commu-
nication system practitioner and linking this identity to a system-internal principal (e.g.,
valid user account) by which this user is known to the system. In other words, authen-
tication is validation that the communicating parties are who they claim to be, and that
messages supposedly sent by these parties are indeed sent by them [27]. Other security ob-
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jectives, most notably authorization, distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate users
based on authentication [28]
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is one of the most important regulatory require-
ments. It means the assurance that irrefutable proof will exist to verify the truthfulness
of any claim of an entity [27,28] which is relevant to establish accountability and liability.
Privacy: Privacy issues have to be covered with the derived customer consumption
data created in metering devices. Consumption data contains detailed information that
can be used to gain insights on a customer’s behavior [28].
Freshness: Freshness indicates that the data in the power system are fresh and not
replayed by an attacker. There are two main quantities that should be included in any
message: the data needed to be communicated, and the delay information. If the message
has only the data without the delay information, it is referred to as having weak freshness.
However, if the message also includes information that can be used to estimate the delay,
it has strong freshness. Weak freshness is sufficient for applications where preventing a
message replay attack is of main concern, but strong freshness is needed for applications
such as time synchronization within networks [24].
Efficiency: Depending on where the solution will be employed, the grid has varying
real-time requirements that make efficiency essential. Common use of constrained devices
and networks add to this need [22].
Scalability: Due to the increasing scale of the power system, scale is important re-
garding the number of devices and the increasing number of interactions between grid
entities [22]. Current smart grid implementations have a small number of devices, e.g.,
AMI. With more AMIs, the transmitted data volume will increase, together with the
bandwidth usage. The physical tampering of smart meters needs to be addressed in wide
AMI deployment [23].
Adaptability and Evolvability: Adaptability and evolvability refer to a device’s
design being able to allow for adaptation and evolution, as most devices last decades, with
some even outlasting the lifetimes of cryptographic tools [22].
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2.1.2 Classification of Threats
Many threats can affect the operation of smart grids at different stages and layers.
These threats are classified in Table 2.1 according to the attack target [34, 35]. A more
detailed explanation for each threat is given below the table.
Table 2.1: Classification of Cyber-Physical Attacks on Smart Grids
Attack Cyber Physical Attack Target
Denial of Service (DoS) X X Availability
Eavesdropping X Confidentiality
False Data Injection (FDI) X Integrity
Malicious software patching X X Authentication
Man-in-the-middle X X Integrity, Confidentiality
Rogue devices X Integrity, Confidentiality
Unauthorized access X Authorization, Confidentiality
Wireless scrambling X Integrity
• Man-in-the-middle attacks: By gaining access to a communication channel, an
adversary can alter metering devices and thus compromise the availability and in-
tegrity of power system data. Conditions and impacts of such attacks are presented
in [36] and a data-framing attack is proposed in [37]. The replay attack is another
form of man-in-the-middle attack that can incur catastrophic negative impacts [38].
• DoS: DoS attacks target the availability security objective by attempting to corrupt,
delay or block critical communication links through flooding the communication with
bogus traffic [39]. Different communication layers in the power systems are found to
be susceptible to DoS attacks [29]: (i) Channel Jamming can occur on the physical
layer, with effects ranging from delayed delivery of messages to complete denial of
service [40]; (ii) in the Media Access Control (MAC) layer, attackers can modify MAC
parameters and cause a spoofing attack. An intrusion-detection method is proposed
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in [41] to detect threats on an IEC61850 automated substation; (iii) network and
transport layer targeted attacks can severely affect the performance of end-to-end
communication. For example, [42] investigated the vulnerability of real hardware
and software to DoS.
• Rogue Devices: If an attacker gains physical access to field devices such as sensors
or Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), they can replace the device with a rogue
that sends corrupted signals or falsely acknowledges the performance of a specific
operation [35,43].
• False Data Injection (FDI): FDI attacks result from injecting (corrupting) mea-
surements data, with the goal of initiating wrong control actions. A well-known FDI
model attacks areas that target the State Estimation (SE) process and bypasses the
Bad Data Detection (BDD), as first introduced by Liu et al. [44]. Several assump-
tions, conditions and scenarios have been studied to launch successful attacks, such
as the usage of AC power flow model [45], attacks on Power Distribution Systems
(PDS) [46], attacks with incomplete information [47], and attacks targeting electric-
ity markets [48]. Counter-measure techniques for attack detection and mitigation
have been investigated in [49–51].
In the present work, we will elaborate more on FDI attacks, as these represent some of
the most common types of cyber attacks on smart grids that target grid integrity. In these
attacks, the adversary targets different signals on the communication system and injects
false data, which then leads to wrong decisions. The result is often significant damage
to power system components as well as power disruption to a large number of customers.
The stages, range, and threats of FDI attacks against critical information infrastructures
are investigated in [52]. Different templates for FDI attacks that are used mainly to test
false data detection approaches are mentioned in the literature [53]. A general expression
of these attacks can be written as:
xa = a1(t)x+ a2(t) (2.1)
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where xa is the attacked signal that the control center operator sees, x is the original signal
that the attacker needs to manipulate, a1(t) is the scaling attack value, and a2(t) is the
additive attack value. Let’s assume that an attack starts at time t1 and ends at t2, the
attack value varies based on the used template as follows.
1. Scaling Attack : This type of attack modifies the communication signal so that
the new value becomes higher or lower, depending on the scaling attack parameter.




c t1 < t < t2
0 otherwise
(2.2)
a2(t) = 0 (2.3)
2. Ramp Attack : This type of attack can be applied by gradually modifying the true
signal through the addition of an increasing or decreasing attack signal.
a1(t) = 0 (2.4)
a2(t) =
{
c.(t− t1) t1 < t < t2
0 otherwise
(2.5)
3. Step Attack : This attack technique involves adding a positive or negative value to
the signal at the moment of disturbance, prompting a transition from zero to the
step magnitude (rising or falling edges).
a1(t) = 0 (2.6)
a2(t) =
{
c t1 < t <∞
0 otherwise
(2.7)
4. Pulse Attack : This attack form represents a special case of the step attack, where
the attacker implements the attack over a specified time.
a1(t) = 0 (2.8)
a2(t) =
{




5. Random Attack : This attack mode takes place by the addition of a random value
to the true signal.
a1(t) = 0 (2.10)
a2(t) =
{
random t1 < t < t2
0 otherwise
(2.11)
where c is constant and t represents the time.
In [54], the authors studied the performance of a Kalman filter under false data injection
attacks and proved a necessary and sufficient condition under which the attacker could
make the estimation error unbounded without being detected. The authors in [55–57]
also used a Kalman filter, this time to detect false data injection and DoS attacks. They
fed both the Kalman filter estimates and system measurements into an χ2-detector to
detect faults and cyber attacks. However, the detection technique using an χ2-detector
was unable to detect statistically derived FDI attacks. Therefore, the authors in [55, 56]
employed Euclidean distance metrics, which are able to identify such sophisticated injection
attacks. The authors in [57] used the cosine similarity approach instead.
A sequential detector based on a likelihood ratio to detect malicious data and FDI
against state estimation was proposed in [58]. Another real-time detector which detects
FDI on the smart grid through state estimation was presented in [59], where the detector
aimed at detecting the FDI as quickly as possible. The authors analyzed their proposed
scheme using a constructed Markov chain-based model that allowed them to configure the
system parameters for guaranteed performance in terms of some predefined metrics.
2.2 Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control
WAMPAC is the concept of using system-wide information and sending selected data
to specific remote locations that are in need of the data. The utilization of system-wide
information makes it easier to monitor the entire system and make better control and
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protection decisions by the energy management system (control center). Figure 2.1 shows
a high-level schematic of the WAMPAC.
Figure 2.1: High-level schematic of WAMPAC
One of the WAMS is PSSE, which is utilized as a well-established mechanism for mon-
itoring the variables of a system’s state. By relying on power measurements as inputs to
the PSSE process, system operators are able to estimate the states and achieve system
observability. As measurements are not free of error or noise, a major component of the
PSSE algorithm is error minimization between the estimated and actual states, such as
the Weight Least Squares (WLS) algorithm [60].
Recently, the integration of PMUs has facilitated obtaining more accurate measure-
ments at a higher resolution, managed by the GPS. As a consequence, instantaneous system
monitoring has become easier and more frequent. PMUs enable real-time synchrophasor
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measurements for voltage and current phasors over the grid. They can also be used to
measure frequency in the power grid.
In addition, phasor measurements provide visibility to the dynamics of the power system
in real time, complementing traditional SCADA measurements that generate one measure-
ment every 2 to 4 seconds. This is mainly because of the low sampling rates and the lack
of time synchronization in SCADA measurements. Therefore, standalone SCADA systems
are unable to provide real-time assessment of the power system. [4].
On the other hand, significant advantages can be obtained from synchrophasor net-
works, as they provide accurate measurements that are deliverable at high rates of up to
60 times per second [3]. Even with the great advantages offered by PMUs, economic con-
straints are still limiting the wide-spread use of PMUs in practice [61]. Several approaches
have been proposed on how to improve monitoring by optimally augmenting SCADA mea-
surements with the more reliable PMU phasor measurements in the PSSE process [62,63].
To protect against possible errors or cyber attacks during the PSSE process, defense mech-
anisms, such as BDD, have been implemented to detect measurements with high error
levels [64].
2.3 Cyber Security of WAMPAC
Generally speaking, an attacker can access WAMPAC schemes through the communica-
tion system, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The problem of cyber attacks is general in all WAMPAC
schemes. However, as mentioned previously, these schemes are so varied in their purpose
and implementation, there is probably no general analysis to illustrate the potential im-
pact of a cyber attack on all such schemes. Nevertheless, we can generalize some types of
system responses. In the following subsections, a review of each type of these schemes is
given. It is important to mention here that many publications have studied the effect of
cyber attacks on AGC systems. However, the effect of cyber attacks on RAS schemes has
not yet been investigated, except for some publications that propose general architecture
for cyber security in smart grids.
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Figure 2.2: Cyber attacks on WAMPAC systems
2.3.1 Automatic Generation Control
Automatic Generation Control is a control scheme which maintains grid frequency and
minimizes tie-line power deviations by adjusting the output power of generators according
to the measurements collected from the distributed sensors in the grid [53, 65, 66]. The
AGC algorithm uses frequency deviation as well as tie-line power flow provided by the
SCADA telemetry system to determine the Area Control Error (ACE), which is the needed
correction that is used to calculate the new Operating Point (OP). The new OP is then





aij∆Ptie,ij + βi∆fi (2.12)
where ∆fi is the frequency deviation of Area i and ∆Ptie,ij is the tie-line power between
areas i and j.
A cyber attack on AGC systems not only has a direct effect on the system frequency
but can also impact the stability and economical operation of the power grid [11]. This is
because frequency changes can trigger some protection actions that may lead to equipment
damage and blackouts [53]. Figure 2.3 shows the data communication links in a two-area
AGC system.
Figure 2.3: Data communication in a simple two-area AGC system
The impact of cyber attacks, including FDI attacks, on AGC systems has been inves-
tigated [66–74]. As well, several approaches have been proposed in the literature to detect
FDI in AGC systems [68, 75–82]. However, approaches to mitigating cyber attacks on
AGC systems are discussed in only a few publications [53,80–82].
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Using reachability analysis, the authors in [69] showed that the attacker can craft a
controlled attack against a two-area AGC system to drive the system frequency away from
its allowable range. They also showed a case of violating the power exchange constraint
between the two areas that might directly or indirectly lead to a swing in the exchange
power. In [70], the authors added more constraints by assuming that the attacker has
limited access to system parameters. They proposed two methods using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimization and a linearized AGC model to show the impact of
cyber attacks on AGC.
In [66, 71], the impact of time-delay attacks on the operation of the AGC systems was
investigated. The impact of FDI attacks on AGC systems were also examined in [67]
through feasibility analysis. Additionally, [72] investigated AGC system vulnerability to
FDI attacks experimentally through testing a system in Iowa, USA, showing FDI attacks
to be potential sources of under-frequency conditions that could result in unnecessary load
shedding.
Different attack scenarios and a detection strategy were proposed in [75]. The detection
scheme is based on a Multi-Layer Perception (MLP) classifier that is used to extract the
differences of ACE under attack and in normal situations, thus distinguishing compromised
signals from normal ones. A universal unknown input and state estimator [79] was proposed
to estimate the values of system states. The obtained system states are then used to
calculate different measurements and compare them with received ones. The obtained
error is used to detect the FDI on AGC systems, if it exceeds a pre-defined threshold.
In [53, 68], the authors used the DC State Estimation (SE) to calculate the values of
the tie-line powers, which they employed to calculate the ACE. A model was developed for
an optimal FDI attack, assuming the attackers’ knowledge of the flow measurements that
are fed to the SE algorithm. They then proposed a method to detect and mitigate the
attacks where the compromised sensors are isolated and only the healthy measurements
are fed to the SE algorithm to calculate the ACE. This was based on the fact that the SE
is an over-determined problem, and therefore removing several compromised elements in
the measurement vector may not affect the estimation much. The authors evaluated the
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impact of a number of compromised sensors on the accuracy of attack-mitigating SE and
concluded that if the number of compromised signals is larger than a specific threshold, the
attack-mitigating SE becomes under-determined and the approach fails to mitigate against
the FDI.
In [80], different attack templates on AGC systems were developed. These attacks
modified the frequency and tie-line power flow measurements to drive the frequency out
of the allowable range. Real-time load forecasts were calculated, after which the anomaly
detection algorithm used this real-time load forecast to predict AGC operations over a
given time period. During operations, the performance of the AGC is compared to this
prediction to identify anomalies. If an attack is detected, the mitigation strategy utilizes
the forecast load to calculate and forecast the ACE instead of using the received data to
calculate it. The effect of the noise was only considered in the ACE forecasting, but the
process and measurement noise were not explicitly modeled.
Law et al. [81] presented security games for risk minimization in AGC. In particular, the
authors provided a model for the attacker-defender interactions using stochastic (Markov)
security games to analyze the best defensive actions under resource constraints. Neverthe-
less, the paper did not focus on the design of attacks, defenses or the controller, but on
the game-theoretic modeling of system risk dynamics under the actions of the attacker and
defender for any given system.
More recently, in [82], the authors proposed a mitigation scheme for FDI attacks against
Load Frequency Control (LFC) systems. The technique described in this reference is
not very practical, since the authors assumed the existence of a number of redundant
communication channels that cannot be simultaneously controlled by the attacker. The
FDI attack detection is performed using a neural network algorithm. When an attack is
detected against the active communication channel, a command is issued to the transmitter
to request a new channel.
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2.3.2 Power System State Estimation
Power System State Estimation (PSSE) is employed as a well-established mechanism
for monitoring the variables of system states. Relying on power measurements as inputs
to the SE process, system operators are able to estimate the states and achieve system
observability. As measurements are not free of error or noise, and the number of measure-
ments is more than the unknown states, a major component of the SE algorithm is error
minimization between the estimated and actual states, such as the WLS algorithm [60].
The most serious type of cyber attack against PSSE is an FDI attack, as it is able
to bypass the BDD to corrupt measurements. There has been a massive research effort
to formulate detection and mitigation techniques against these types of attacks, with [83]
surveying recent work in this area.
In [84, 85], the authors proposed online deep learning techniques to detect attacks
based on temporal and spatial measurement variations caused by the attacks. A non-
linear interval observer is proposed in [86] for attack detection and isolation of targeted
sensors. The technique is based on estimating the interval state of the internal physical
system and is used both as a reference and to raise an alarm when the interval residual does
not include the zero value. The authors in [87] compare four algorithms based on a matrix
separation technique to detect FDI attacks with higher efficiency and faster computation
performance in large-scale systems.
Bobba et al. [88] explored how to detect FDI attacks: One way is to secure basic
measurements which are selected strategically, while another way is to verify state variables
independently, after selecting them strategically. Specifically, the authors showed that
protecting basic measurements is sufficient and necessary for the detection of FDI attacks.
The protection of meter measurements includes both physical and software methods, such
as guard patrolling, video monitoring, tamper-proof communication systems, sophisticated
authentication protocols, asymmetric encryption mechanisms, etc.
In their work, Dan and Sandberg [89] proposed greedy algorithms for perfect and partial
countermeasures against FDI attacks. Perfect defense means that no FDI attacks can occur.
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Due to so many meters in power systems, to make all devices encrypted overnight is not
possible. Since the defense budget might not be sufficient for perfect countermeasures,
the control center would consider protecting a subset of meters to maximize the increased
system security. The authors also investigated the protection metric of maximizing the
minimal attack cost among all meters.
Kosut et al. [90] considered two regimes of FDI attacks on state estimation in smart
grids, where for the weak attack regime, the number of meters that the attacker manipulates
is smaller than that in the strong attack regime. The problem is addressed by the adversary
from a decision theoretic point of view [91, 92]. For the system operator, a generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector is devised with incorporation of historical data. The
Bayesian formulation can take advantage of priori information to preserve and trace the
likely state of the system.
Kim and Poor [93] proposed strategic countermeasures against FDI attacks on the
power grid based on linearized measurement models. They first suggested devising a new
low-complexity attacking strategy, after which they designed a greedy approach to protect
a number of meter measurements for defense. Finally, they developed another greedy
approach to promote the PMU deployment to defend against such attacks.
Giani et al. [94,95] investigated unobservable data integrity attacks on power systems.
First, an efficient approach was presented to obtain all the sparse attacks where a modest
number of meter measurements are compromised. Known-secure PMUs were used as coun-
termeasures against such cyber attacks. Finding a way to ascertain the minimum number
of necessary PMUs at carefully chosen buses was finally analyzed for defense.
Bi and Zhang [96] proposed countermeasures against FDI attacks by protecting crit-
ical state variables. To this end, the authors carefully selected a minimum number of
meter measurements to be protected. Both optimal and complexity-reduced suboptimal
approaches were provided to obtain the defense objective at the minimum cost. After
characterizing the problem into a Steiner tree in graph theory, the researchers leveraged
graphical methods to select the minimum number of meter measurements [49]. In addi-
tion, by jointly considering the conventional protecting meter measurements and the covert
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topological information, they further proposed a mixed protection strategy, in case either
of them failed to obtain the defense objective [50, 97].
2.3.3 Wide-Area Under-Frequency Load Shedding Protection
There has been massive number of publications in the literature that discussed the topic
of cyber attacks on AGC and PSSE as explained in the previous sections. Nevertheless, the
cyber security of Wide-Area Protection Schemes (including WAUFLS schemes) have been
barely touched or just been visited quickly in the papers that discusses the cyber security
of WAMPAC in general like [98]. To the best knowledge of the authors, only one reference
has discussed the data integrity attacks to load shedding schemes in power systems [99],
not to under-frequency load shedding specifically. In this subsection, the recent trends in
UFLS protection schemes are discussed.
Generally speaking, Wide-Area Protection (WAP) is a new centralized kind of protec-
tion system that is based on wide-area measurements. It can also coordinate with conven-
tional protections to protect critical loads, rapidly isolate faulty electrical components, reli-
ably and accurately perform online security analysis for the post-fault or post-disturbance
system, and take appropriate measures when necessary to prevent the power system from
cascading or outages or even blackouts from occurring [100]. WAUFLS protection schemes
have recently been replacing conventional under-frequency protection relays.
The main reason for under-frequency in a power system is the unbalance between
generation and load. This takes place when a large generator is tripped, a sudden load
is connected, or a large interconnection line is disconnected. Load shedding is a process
used to relieve this mismatch by regaining the balance between load and generation [101].
Under-frequency load shedding schemes must have the following four characteristics [102]:
1. Their action should be quick so that the frequency drop is halted before more catas-
trophic events can occur.
2. Unnecessary actions must be avoided.
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3. The protection system should be liable and redundant, as a malfunction of it would
surely lead to power system cascading.
4. The amount of load to be shed should always be the minimum possible but still
sufficient to restore the security of the grid and to avoid the minimum allowable
frequency being overcome.
Traditionally, UFLS schemes were local and depended only on the absolute value of
the frequency [102, 103]. These techniques basically shed a certain amount of the load
under relief when the system frequency falls below a certain threshold. If the frequency
keeps on falling after the first shed, further sheds are performed when lower thresholds
are passed. The values of the thresholds and the relative amounts of load to be shed are
decided off-line, on the basis of experience and simulations. Some of these techniques are
based on measuring the Rate of Change of Frequency (ROCOF) when a certain frequency
threshold is reached. These strategies are called semi-adaptive techniques [102].
Many centralized WAUFLS schemes have recently been proposed [104–109] that utilize
the ROCOF and depend on the system frequency response. The value of ROCOF at the
moment of disturbance is proportional to the size of the disturbance through the inertia
constant H. Thus, given the value of the system inertia, the value of ROCOF at the moment
of the disturbance provides an indication of the size of the disturbance, thereby enabling
the activation of load shedding. One disadvantage of this method is that if generators or
large synchronous motors are disconnected during the disturbance, the inertia of the system
needs to be adapted accordingly. It has been proven that this method works efficiently with
large systems characterized by high inertia. [102]. In the following paragraphs, schemes
that are considered for testing in this work are reviewed.
In [104], a UFLS scheme based on the voltage stability of the system was proposed.
Following a disturbance, a voltage stability risk index (VSRI) is calculated at all load
buses. This index is then used to suggest a dynamic voltage stability criterion by which
suitable locations for load shedding can be chosen. Another approach of adaptive UFLS
was presented in [105], where the authors used the non-recursive Newton-type algorithm to
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locally estimate the frequency of the system as well as the ROCOF. These values are sent
to the control center and used to calculate the amount of disturbance, if any. Accordingly,
a control action was then derived and distributed throughout the power system.
In [106], an approach for obtaining a few-seconds-in-advance frequency prediction was
tested. This technique makes decisions about the amount of load to be shed, while at
the same time being aware that inaccuracies in the procedure are inevitable. The scheme
depends on calculating the frequency of the wide area by calculating the average of PMUs
measurements. It then tries to approximate the deviation of the frequency to a second-
order polynomial or a straight line based on the frequency declination. Accordingly, it can
predict the time or frequency at which the system frequency violates the allowable values
and, depending on the predicted values, it can calculate the amount of load to be shed.
This process continues until reaching the nominal value of the frequency again.
In [108], a centralized adaptive under-frequency load shedding controller (CAULSC)
based on UFLS and Distribution State Estimation (DSE) was proposed for microgrids with
distributed resources when they are operated as isolated islands. The proposed controller
calculates the amount of disturbance in two different ways according to the nature of the
disturbance. If the microgrid is islanded from the grid or if one of the generators in the
microgrid is disconnected and the microgrid has already been islanded, the power flow
model of the system is used to calculate the magnitude of disturbance. If the disturbance
is a sudden change in the load demand, the frequency at the center of inertia of the system
and the ROCOF are utilized, using the swing equation to calculate the magnitude of
disturbance. Finally, the DSE estimates the load demand at each bus and distributes the
load shedding between different buses accordingly.
Two centralised adaptive load shedding algorithms are proposed in [109]. The first algo-
rithm is response-based and the second one is a combination of event-based and response-
based methods. The proposed methods are capable of preserving power system instability
even for large disturbances and combinational events. They use both frequency and voltage
variables to select appropriate amounts of load shedding.
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2.4 Discussion and List of Gaps
There are numerous existing applications of wide-area protection and control systems,
with some examples described and discussed above. Existing implementations use simple
measurements, and sometimes the measurements are local only. In most cases, however,
the measurements and actions use wide-area information and communications systems.
Therefore, more attention must be paid towards the security of these applications, as
otherwise, catastrophic disasters may occur.
Based on the literature survey conducted above, the following list of gaps has been
extracted:
1. The impact of FDI attacks on AGC systems has been investigated using different
methodologies. Nevertheless, the mitigation against the effect of FDI on AGC sys-
tems has barely been touched [53,80–82].
2. The above-mentioned papers provided their solutions and some case studies where
their solutions apply. None of them provides formal proofs for the stability of the
system after incorporating the attack mitigation scheme nor the unbiasedness of the
estimated signals.
3. All the above works considered a linear model of the AGC system. In other words,
none of these works considered the different sources of AGC nonlinearities, which
include dead-band of speed governor, transmission delay, and Generation Rate Con-
straints (GRC). Consequently, the derived FDI attack detection schemes proposed
in the preceding studies may fail when the underlying AGC system is nonlinear.
4. Despite the fact that the problem of cyber attacks against wide-area control and mon-
itoring schemes (for example AGC and PSSE) is considered in many publications, the
impact on all other schemes, including RAS schemes, has barely been acknowledged.
5. Despite the above-mentioned advancements in wide-area monitoring using PSSE
based on PMU measurements, the current WAUFLS protection schemes still de-
pend on older techniques to evaluate system disturbances. These techniques rely
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only on the characteristics of system frequency measurements, which are prone to
cyber attacks. An attacker can drag the system to blackout if access to any of these




This chapter investigates the problem of cyber-physical attacks on AGC systems, PSSE,
and WAUFLS protection schemes. As well, attacker capabilities and possible damage
that can be caused to the power system as a result of an attack are also given, along
with the mathematical formulation of each attack scenario. To support the formulations,
various attack scenarios are simulated in MATLAB/Simulink and PSCAD/EMTDC, using
practical systems.
3.1 False Data Injection (FDI) Attack Model
WAMPAC schemes use IEC 61850 communication protocols. These protocols use dif-
ferent communication media i.e., wireless, fiber optics and Microwave, and support in-
creased communication between both local and remote substation devices. However, this
increases the exposure of the remote substations to cyber attacks because these substa-
tions are geographically dispersed and often maintain limited physical network protec-
tions [8, 41, 98, 110–112]. Therefore, it is assumed that the attacker has access to a subset
of system measurements through the communication system. This subset includes both
frequency and power flow measurements. It is also assumed that these measurements are
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sent through a wireless medium that the attacker can access, but that the attacker cannot
physically access the system at any point. In addition, the attacker cannot access/tamper
with control decisions of the control center/EMS decisions [81]. Without this constraint, it
is a trivial exercise for any attacker that has successfully penetrated the protected network
to trigger cascading failures across the power grid. It is therefore conceivable that an en-
ergy provider would make protecting its EMS its foremost priority. Protecting every other
single communication link in the power system is extremely expensive, especially in large
power systems that mainly depend on the communication network that carries hundreds
of signals.
Table 3.1 summarizes the objectives, capabilities and limitations of the attacker as well
as the assumptions that this work is based on. The attack model mentioned in Table 3.1
is used throughout the work.








- cause system-wide blackout
- cause equipment damage
- cause power disruption
Capabilities - has access to any or all frequency measurements
- has access to power flow measurements
Limitation(s) - cannot access the system physically
- has no access to the control decision signals
Assumption(s) - system measurements are sent through wireless communication
3.2 FDI Attacks on AGC Systems
3.2.1 State-Space Model of the AGC System
The control block diagram of the utilized two-area AGC system used throughout the
first part of this study is described in [65]. A modified version of this block diagram is
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shown in Fig. 3.1, where three additional inputs, labeled d1, d2 and d3, are added to model
the effect of FDI attacks on the frequency deviation in Area 1, ∆f1, frequency deviation in
Area 2, ∆f2, and tie-line power ∆Ptie, respectively. Table A.1 shows the assumed numerical
values for the system parameters.
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the two-area AGC system, where d1, d2, d3 denote the FDI attack
signals and d̂1, d̂2, d̂3 denote the corresponding estimates
The system is modeled using the following state-space equation:
ẋ(t) = Acx(t) +Bcu(t) + ω(t) (3.1)
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where the system state vector x(t) includes changes in the frequency ∆f , the mechanical
turbine power ∆Pm, the steam valve position (governor power) ∆PV , the AGC integrator
output for both areas, and the tie-line power. More precisely,
x = [∆f1,∆PT1,∆Pg1,∆f2,∆PT2,∆Pg2,∆Ptie, ACE1, ACE2]
> (3.2)
The load disturbances in Area 1 and Area 2 are denoted by u(t) = [u1(t), u2(t)]
>, and ω(t)
indicates the process noise. Following [71, 113], the state-space matrices for the two-area
AGC system considered throughout our investigation are obtained as explained below.
Area 1 includes three system state variables, namely the frequency deviation at Area 1,
∆f1, the turbine output power ∆PT1, and the governor output power ∆Pg1. These state






























































The tie-line power is related to the frequency deviation in both areas, as follows:
∆̇P tie = Ps∆f1 − Ps∆f2 (3.9)
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The ACE for each area is defined as:
˙ACE1 = −KI1B1∆f1 −KI1∆Ptie −KI1B1d1 −KI1d3 (3.10)
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To make (3.1) suitable for numerical simulations, it has to be discretized. The sampled
discrete-time model of the Ac and Bc matrices is given by:





where Ts is the sampling period. Therefore, the discretized state-space model of the con-
sidered two-area power system is:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + ωk (3.14)
where xk and uk are the state and input vectors at time step k, respectively. The sampling
rate is considered to be 10 ms in this work.
3.2.2 Stealthy FDI Attacks on AGC Systems
The attacker can manipulate the frequency signals of different areas, the tie-line power
signals, or both. When these falsified data are reported to the control center, the control
center operator calculates a false value for the ACE of different areas, and false generator
correction values are sent to different generators. For an n area system, the new value of




aij(∆Ptie,ij + AP ) + βi(∆fi + Af ) (3.15)
where Af and AP are the FDI attack signals in frequency measurements and tie-line power,
respectively.
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For an FDI attack to be stealthy, it needs to bypass the bad data detection algorithms
implemented within the control center. Moreover, the grid operator may apply other data
quality checks on the received measurements. For instance, the measurements should not
change significantly over a short period. Intuitively, if each element of the FDI attack
vector is bounded around zero, these data quality checks, designed to be insensitive to
natural random noises in the measurements, will not be alerted [53]. Thus, for the attack
to be effective, the selection of attack parameters (e.g., magnitude and rate of change)
is critical from the attacker’s perspective. The parameters have to be selected such that
the attack creates the desired impact but does not trigger any data quality alarms in the
control center. For example, in AGC systems, abrupt changes and excessive values for the
ACE would be avoided by attackers to evade detection. For Area i, this can be formulated
mathematically using the following expression:
|ACEi,t − ACEi,t+T
T
| < ψ (3.16)
where ACEi,t is the ACE signal at time t for Area i, T is the time interval where two
successive ACE samples are measured, and ψ is the maximum ACE signal curve slope [80].
In this work, detection and mitigation of slowly varying attack signals are considered
because they satisfy the above conditions and allow for stealthy attacks. Nevertheless, the
proposed approach, in this chapter, is not restricted to this class of attacks and can detect
and mitigate other types of FDI attacks.
A stealthy attack scenario is carried out to show the effectiveness of FDI attacks on
the operation of a two-area AGC. A pre-scheduled load reduction of 20% took place in
Area 1. To simulate a gradual increase in the system frequency, the attacker injected a
ramp signal with a slope of 0.001 to the frequency measurement signals of areas 1 and
2. Due to this attack, the control center operator sees that there is an over-frequency
condition in the system. Accordingly, and based on the calculated ACE, the control center
operator decides to reduce the generation to avoid the over-frequency condition. However,
the real situation in the system is the opposite, i.e., the system frequency is dropping and
an under-frequency condition has developed, as shown in Fig. 3.2. This situation might
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force the under-frequency control in the generator to shut down, causing a system-wide
blackout.















(a) Frequency deviation in Area 1















(b) Frequency deviation in Area 2
Figure 3.2: AGC performance under attack scenario 1
3.3 FDI Attacks on PSSE
Power System State Estimation (PSSE) is employed to ensure system stability and
observability of state variables, such as voltage magnitudes and phase angles of all buses.
These states are estimated based on available field measurements. In the general formula-
tion of ac PSSE, power flow measurements are related to the system states by:
z = h(x) + e (3.17)
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where z is the power flow measurement vector that includes voltage, active/reactive power
injection, and active/reactive power flows from system meters, x is the system state vector
of voltage magnitudes and angles, h(x) is a nonlinear function that maps the states to
the measurements, and e is the measurement error vector. The optimal estimates of the
system states are obtained by means of a WLS optimization problem:
minimize J(x) = (z − h(x))TW (z − h(x)) (3.18)
where W is the co-variance diagonal matrix of error inverses, representing weights based on
meter accuracy. The standard procedure for solving (3.18) is applying iterative methods








W (z − h(x̂)) (3.19)
where x̂ is the estimated state vector, obtained by the iterative process of the resulting
nonlinear equation.
Note that the attacker can manipulate voltage magnitudes, phase angles, or both. In
this work, only voltage magnitudes are considered as target state variables to be manipu-
lated, as per the attack objective. This can be done indirectly by altering the measurements
which are dependent on any given state variable. The Jacobian matrix of h(x), Jh, maps
the relation between the system states and measurements and thus allows it to determine










































The Jh rows correspond to m measurements and the columns correspond to n state vari-
ables. For any measurement that is directly dependent on the a specific state variable, the
corresponding element in row and column must be non-zero.
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To find the set of measurements needed to alter a specific state variable, the attacker
considers the rows of measurements for which the column of the targeted state has non-
zero elements. This analysis yields the upper bound on the number of measurements to
be attacked. In order to determine the value of manipulation of these measurements, the
attacker then considers the power flow equations:
Pij =V
′2
i · gij − V ′i Vj · gij cos (θi − θj)









+ V ′i Vj · bij cos (θi − θj)
− V ′i Vj · gij sin (θi − θj) (3.22)
where V ′i is the voltage magnitude to be altered at bus i, θi is the voltage angle at bus i,
and gij, bij, and b
sh
ij are the conductance, susceptance, and shunt susceptance of the line










where Ω is the system bus’s set. It follows that in order to change the voltage magnitude
at bus i, power flow equations (3.21)-(3.24) are solved to determine the required changes
in measurements. Let vector ~c represent the vector of values to be added to the state
variables. Based on this attack formulation, the condition for a stealthy FDI attack has
been outlined for ac systems, as follows:
‖za − h(x̂bad)‖ = ‖z + a− h(x̂+ c)‖
= ‖z − hx̂‖ ≤ τ (3.25)
37
where ~a is the attack vector and ~za is the resulting manipulated measurements vector.
Therefore, the criteria for a stealthy hidden attack are given by:
a = h(x̂+ c)− h(x̂) (3.26)
This attack vector manipulates state variables without raising the BDD alarm. The algo-
rithm is grounded in the following assumptions [45]: 1) All measurements in the sub-graph
surrounding a power injecting bus are to be changed; 2) power injection change summa-
tions must be kept at zero; and 3) attack vector sparsity depends on system topology. It
is worth mentioning that the attack strategy must also adhere to the electrical laws of the
power networks (e.g., current and power nodal balances).
3.4 FDI Attacks on UFLS Schemes
3.4.1 Operation of WAUFLS
According to the literature, and as depicted in Fig. 3.3, the general procedure of
WAUFLS schemes [114] can be summarized as follows:
i. The control center receives frequency measurements for different areas from the PMUs
installed in the system. The ROCOF is calculated either by the PMUs or locally at
the control center in the grid.
ii. The frequency measurement and ROCOF values are used to evaluate system dis-
turbance. Currently, the magnitude of disturbance is calculated by swing equations
for all generators [104–107, 109, 115]. For the i-th generator in a system with N
generators, it can be written as:







Figure 3.3: Schematic of WAUFLS protection schemes
where ∆Pi is the imbalance between generation and load(s) in pu, Pmi is the pu input
mechanical power, Pei is the pu output electrical power, Hi is the inertia constant in
sec, fi is the frequency in Hz, and fn is the system nominal frequency in Hz. The
total resulting magnitude of disturbance can be obtained by summing the individual

















where fc is the frequency of the equivalent center of inertia.
iii. The control center determines the amount of load to be shed (power mismatch) based
on the amount of the disturbance and system spinning reserve as [104,107]:
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Pshed = 1.05× (∆P − Pth) (3.30)
where Pth is the the threshold value of power mismatch (available spinning reserve),
and 1.05 is introduced for compensating the simplifying hypotheses adopted to de-
velop the reduced SFR model.
iv. Finally, a shedding control action is sent by the control center to an area or shared
between different areas based on disturbance information, which includes the nature
of the disturbance, the location of the disturbance, and a load sensitivity analysis.
To achieve load shedding, a combination of loads is selected such that the sum of
their total active powers is as close as possible to Pshed. There are different criteria by
which load shedding locations can be selected. However, the most common criteria
used in wide-area applications is the voltage collapse-based load shedding, as the
voltage collapses rapidly after a disturbance [104,107,109,116–118].
The shedding locations are mainly selected based on the location of disturbance [104].
In other words, the load shedding is distributed between the buses that are close to the
disturbance according to their voltage dip during the disturbance. All area buses are
ranked based on voltage dips. Accordingly, the load shedding at bus i is proportional





where ∆Vi is the voltage dip at bus i immediately after the disturbance, and Nv is
the set of buses that have the highest voltage dip. Once the load to be shed is known
for all buses, the shedding process takes place in steps.
3.4.2 Attack Strategies
The following subsections explain in detail three different scenarios by which the at-
tacker can target the operation of the WAUFLS schemes in the power systems. Depending
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Figure 3.4: Frequency values at different buses
on what data are available for the attacker (attacker’s access level), the attacker can launch
an attack. The first scenario explains how can the attacker launch an attack if they have
access to one or more frequency signals. It is shown that the attacker will have a full con-
trol over the amount of load to be shed. The second scenario explains the case where the
attacker has access to PFMs. In this case, the attacker cannot manipulate the amount of
load to be shed, but they can force the control center operator to shed load from incorrect
locations. Finally, if the attacker has access to both PFMs and frequency measurements,
they can fake a disturbance and cause unnecessary load shedding by the control center.
A. Targeting the magnitude of disturbance
Power system frequency is usually dealt with as a global parameter. However, many
results in the literature indicate that the frequency slightly differs from one neighboring
area to another during system transients [119]. This is also shown in the simulation results
of Fig. 3.4 for the IEEE 39 bus system, where small deviations between frequency values
at different buses can be seen clearly. The deviations give attackers an opportunity to
manipulate each frequency measurement value separately. In some systems, point-to-point
secure communication links are used for frequency measurements, but due to the cost of
the links, not all control systems implement them to secure frequency measurements.
As mentioned above, control centers make use of the values of a frequency and its
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derivative to evaluate system-wide disturbances using swing equations to calculate the
amount of load required to be shed. Equation (3.28) also shows that the magnitude of
disturbance given by the swing equation (∆P ) depends more on the ROCOF than on the
frequency value itself. This allows the attacker to construct an FDI attack that does not
change the magnitude of the frequency significantly, though it does change the slope of
the frequency signal to affect the calculated magnitude of disturbance. In other words,
the attacker works on manipulating the ROCOF, not the frequency magnitude, in order to
have the maximum effect on the swing equation output. Hence, the attacker can control
the output of the swing equation (∆P ) to force the control center operator to make a
wrong action, either by shedding a lower load amount (leading to system blackout) or
shedding a higher load amount (causing damage to system equipment due to over-frequency
conditions). To launch such an attack, the attacker does not need to access the system
physically. However, he or she does need to access one or more frequency measurement
signals, which can occur if that signal is sent through wireless communication.
To formulate the attack mathematically, it is assumed that the attacker injects a linear
varying signal to one or more frequency measurements. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that the FDI takes place on all frequency values. The frequency value of generator
i after manipulation is:
fia = fi ±mit (3.32)
where mi is the slope of the attack signal. Substituting the new frequency values into






































= ∆P ±∆Pattack (3.34)
Hence, the attacker needs only to calculate the slopes of the injected signal to change
the magnitude of disturbance, which then changes the total amount of load to be shed.
The above model of the attack is generic, i.e., the attacker can manipulate only one or
two frequency values. In this case, the value of the injected signals into other frequency
measurements is zero.
B. Targeting Load Shedding Distribution
As aforementioned, system operators utilize bus voltage magnitudes in order to ac-
curately perform load shedding, using (3.31), from buses with the highest voltage dips.
Therefore, an attacker needs to manipulate the voltage magnitudes on target buses in
order to compromise the load shedding process. In this section, the stealthy FDI attack
formulation that allows manipulation of specific bus voltages is presented. This formu-
lation serves as a basis for the attack scenario that involves compromising the shedding
distribution.
Equipped with the ability to target specific buses and manipulate voltage magnitudes,
the attacker can easily compromise the load shedding distribution process. This is ac-
complished by changing the load shedding amount on a given bus and/or inducing load
shedding on a bus outside of the initial load shedding setting. In other words, voltage
disturbances at target locations (i.e., those which have a high voltage dip) are shown if
they have a negligible voltage dip. At the same time, voltages of targeted buses (i.e., those
which have a low voltage dip) are shown if they have the highest voltage dip. The attack
can be formulated as follows:
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i. Let set Ψ represent the initial set of buses on which load shedding is to be performed,
with a load shedding amount of Pshedψ , where ψ ∈ Ψ. Also, let set Φ represent the set
of buses the attacker is targeting to shed power from, with a load shedding amount of
P ′shedφ , where φ ∈ Φ. The selection of set Φ can be based on a sensitivity analysis of
the system to power shedding, buses with lowest voltage dips, or buses with critical
loads.
ii. The attacker then aims to change the voltage magnitudes to
V ′φ = Vφ + cφ, ∀φ ∈ Φ (3.35)
V ′ψ = Vψ + cψ, ∀ψ ∈ Ψ (3.36)
where V ′φ (V
′
ψ) is the new voltage magnitude for bus φ (ψ) after adding the attack
value cφ (cψ), as per (3.25) and (3.26). For set Φ, the attacker increases the voltage
dip to incur more load shedding using (3.35) while decreasing the voltage dip of set
Ψ to reduce the load shedding using (3.35).
iii. Due to the variation in voltage magnitude, the amount of shedding power for each







Note that sets Φ and Ψ are independent and may overlap in certain buses. A special
case of this attack will occur if the attacker chooses to have Φ = Ψ and only change
the load distribution within the set.
C. Faking Underfrequency Conditions
In the previous subsections, we saw that the attacker has to synchronize the attack
launch with a system disturbance. However, in the scenario considered here, the attacker’s
objective is to trick the system into responding as if it were experiencing under-frequency
conditions that require activation of WAUFLS. In essence, the attacker fakes a disturbance
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condition that misguides the system operator to launching an unnecessary load shedding
process.
In this attack scenario, the attacker manipulates both the frequency measurements
and the power flow measurements z. This gives the attacker access to a higher number
of meters, depending on the disturbance size, type and location. For example, if the
attacker needs to fake a disturbance that includes the tripping of a specific generator, the
attacker has to manipulate both the system frequency measurements and the power flow
measurements of the meters that are close to this generator to reflect the disturbance on the
state estimation results. This subsection explains how the attacker can fake disturbance
conditions by considering different access levels to the system.
In disturbances that affect system frequency, it is expected that the voltage magnitudes
would strongly deviate from the steady-state voltage profile. The FDI attack formulation
given by (3.26) indicates that the attacker manipulates the power flow measurement to
change the voltage profile to resemble a post-disturbance one. Undoubtedly, there is always
a limitation on the number of measurement nodes the attacker is able to compromise. Thus,
the objective of the attack is to manipulate the minimum number of measurements while
simultaneously attempting to generate a voltage profile that matches as much as possible
an actual post-disturbance voltage profile for all the buses.
Keep in mind that the attacker prioritizes stealth in the attacks, which limits the avail-
able techniques. Nonetheless, there are several approaches for targeting the manipulated
states, such as minimizing the number of attacked measurements, constraining the attacks
to a subset of states, and minimizing the probability of detection [45]. In this scenario,
the attacks are launched based on the formulation in the previous section, in addition to
selecting a subset of buses based on a threshold criterion.
The first step is to analyze variations between voltage magnitudes for each bus in the
system at steady-state and post-disturbance. As expected, there is an inverse relation
between the number of buses and the magnitude of ∆V . We devise the FDI strategy based
on the ∆V threshold, as follows:
i. Simulate a disturbance scenario and determine the deviation index Di, between
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steady-state (Vss) and post-disturbance voltage magnitude (Vd) for each bus i ∈ Ω
at time step t in the simulation period T :
Di = max
{
abs(V (t)di − V (t)ssi)
}
, ∀t ∈ T,∀i ∈ Ω (3.38)
Note that max operator ensures that the threshold is based on the entirety of the
simulation period T , and the absolute value is considered to account for positive and
negative voltage deviations. The purpose of this step is to determine the maximum
deviation of voltages during the disturbance for all buses.
ii. Classify each bus i according to whether it belongs to the attack set Ωa, if it exceeds
the pre-defined threshold γ, i.e., Bus i ∈ Ωa if Di ≥ γ. The threshold represents
the maximum allowable tolerance for voltage deviation between the disturbance and
steady-state cases. A higher threshold γ implicates a smaller attack subset Ωa, while
at the same time giving a higher probability for raising suspicion with the system
operator, as more buses would have a steady-state voltage profile rather than a
disturbance profile. In effect, in this step, the attacker makes a compromise between
the size of the attack vector and the probability of being detected. The threshold is
determined by analyzing the voltage profile and normal deviations in voltages during
steady-state operation.
iii. Launch a constrained FDI attack on power flow measurements that only targets
buses belonging to the subset Ωa. An indispensable condition for the success of such
an attack is the ability to target specific state variables, as outlined in the attack
formulation. It is intended to leave the remaining buses voltages unchanged from the
state estimation process, as the variation between the state estimation voltages and
the disturbances voltages would be of lesser magnitude and importance, respectively,
based on the chosen case threshold. The index i determines the value of the attack
element ci to be added to the system state estimate x̂i , as per (3.26), as follows:
x̂att,i =
x̂i + ci, if i ∈ Ωax̂i, otherwise (3.39)
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where x̂att,i is the attacked state estimate. For this scenario, the attacker launches the
attacks based on the pre-determined threshold γ. A compromise is made between the
number of attacked measurements and the allowed deviation between perceived and ex-
pected voltage profiles.
3.4.3 Simulation Results
The attack scenarios discussed above are implemented on the IEEE 14 and IEEE 39
bus systems- shown in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, respectively- to assess their impact on the
power network. Detailed models of both systems are simulated in PSCAD and used for
the study. Different attack scenarios are applied to simulate healthy system conditions,
normal system disturbances, and transient conditions.
A. Targeting the magnitude of disturbance
The following scenarios show the system frequency (i.e., frequency of center of inertia) as
well as the magnitude of disturbance with and without an attack. They also show how the
attacker can target higher or lower amounts of load to be shed. The first two scenarios show
the effect of the attack on the calculated magnitude of disturbance. However, scenarios
3 and 4 show how this attack can affect the whole system if the control center operator
makes load shedding decisions based on manipulated measurements.
Scenario 1: With the outage of generator G3 in the IEEE 14 bus system, which
is connected to bus 2, the transmission line connecting buses 2 and 5 is tripped due to
overloading at t = 20 sec. At this moment, the attacker starts increasing the measurement
of f2 using a false signal of slope m = 0.02. The control center operator, in response,
decides to shed a lower amount of load because the magnitude of calculated disturbance
becomes lower (i.e., 0.55 pu instead of 1.05 pu) at the instant of disturbance, as shown in
Fig. 3.7b. Figure 3.7 shows the center of inertia frequency as well as the magnitude of
disturbance based on real and manipulated frequency values.
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Figure 3.5: IEEE 14 bus system
Scenario 2: During an overload condition, e.g., when the IEEE 14 bus system has
20% additional load, the line connecting buses 1 and 5 is tripped at t = 20 sec. At this
moment, the attacker decreases the measurement corresponding to the frequency of G5
using a signal that has a slope m = −0.05, as shown in Fig. 3.8a, aiming to increase the
amount of load shedding. This results in a higher magnitude of disturbance (i.e., 2 pu
instead of 1 pu), as shown in Fig. 3.8b.
It can be shown from the previous scenarios that injecting FDI into frequency mea-
surements has a direct effect on the calculated magnitude of disturbance. Moreover, if the
control center uses the falsified measurements to make load shedding decisions, disaster
events might take place, as discussed in the following scenarios.
A large system disturbance takes place at t = 16 sec in the IEEE 39 bus system. The
accepted variation in the value of fc, where load shedding is not needed, is set at ±1% of
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Figure 3.6: Schematic of IEEE 39 New England system
the nominal frequency values (59.4− 60.6 Hz for the used 60 Hz system). The shedding
process starts when the frequency of the center of inertia falls below 59.3 Hz. Scenarios
1 and 2 show how an attacker can manipulate system frequency signals to either increase
or decrease the amount of load shedding and how this affects system frequency. In these
scenarios, the values of the FDI on the frequency signal of generator i, given by mit, are
chosen arbitrarily just to show the effect of the attack.
Scenario 3: Using the IEEE 39 bus New England system, the attacker manipulates
the measurement corresponding to the frequency of generator G8 by increasing it, using
an FDI signal that has a slope m8 = 0.02. The center of inertia frequency fc is then
calculated to be higher than the system’s actual center of inertia frequency. This causes
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(a) Real and manipulated center of inertia frequency













(b) Real and manipulated amount of disturbance
Figure 3.7: Targeting lower amount of load shedding
the calculated magnitude of disturbance ∆P to be 0.3 pu, which is lower than the actual
disturbance in the system (∆Pa < ∆P ), as shown in Fig. 3.9a. Consequently, as seen from
Fig. 3.9b, the control center operator will perform only one shedding step with a lower
amount of load, whereas two shedding steps are needed. The highlighted shedding step is
the one prompted by the attack. As can be seen, the attack causes the system frequency
to keep falling, thus forcing the under-frequency control in the generators to shut down
and cause a system-wide blackout.
Scenario 4: In this scenario, it is assumed that the attacker is able to manipulate
the generator G6 frequency by adding a signal that has a slope m6 = −0.05. This causes
the calculated magnitude of disturbance ∆P to be 0.7 pu, which is higher than the actual
disturbance in the system (∆Pa > ∆P ), as shown in Fig. 3.10a. Hence, the decision of the
control center is to shed an amount of load that is higher than necessary. The highlighted
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(a) Real and manipulated center of inertia frequency














(b) Real and manipulated amount of disturbance
Figure 3.8: Targeting higher amount of load shedding
shedding steps in Fig. 3.10b are executed due to the attack. Consequently, as shown in the
same figure, over-frequency occurs for a long period of time, which might cause damage to
system equipment.
In the scenarios described above, the attacker injects a small attack signal, which does
not affect the magnitude of the frequency (i.e., it bypasses the bad data detection) but
does affect the ROCOF. In other words, the attacker can control how the frequency signals
change. As a result, the attacker can control the slope of the frequency signal as well as
the magnitude of disturbance. Ultimately, the attacker has full control of the amount of
load to be shed.
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(a) Real and manipulated center of inertia frequency frequency















First shedding step (due to attack)
(b) Real and manipulated amount of disturbance
Figure 3.9: Targeting lower amounts of load shedding
B. Targeting Load Shedding Distribution
Following a disturbance that requires load shedding of 1000 MW in the IEEE 39 bus
system, the subset of buses that have the highest voltage dips are: {39, 9, 8, 7, 1}. As
bus 9 and 1 have no load to shed, the distribution process can only take place on buses
39, 8, and 7, following (3.31), as shown in Table 3.2, where i is the bus number, Vpd,i
is the pre-disturbance voltage magnitude at bus i, and Vd,i is the disturbance voltage
magnitude at bus i. In the following two scenarios, the attacker has nothing to do with
the magnitude of frequency disturbance, i.e., the attacker does not attack the frequency
measurements. Instead, FDI attacks take place on the power flow measurements to alter
voltage magnitudes, as they represent the main variable in the load shedding process.
Scenario 5: This scenario features an attack scenario of maliciously changing the
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(a) Real and manipulated system frequency and magnitude of disturbance















Third shedding step (due to attack)
Second shedding step (due to attack)
(b) UFLS with and without attack
Figure 3.10: Targeting higher amounts of load shedding
amount of load shedding Pshed,i, calculated from (3.31) on bus j, by varying the distur-
bance voltage values of the shedding buses. Figure 3.11 depicts the effects of an FDI
attack on shedding distribution, while Table 3.3 demonstrates the change of load shedding
distribution following the attack.
Scenario 6: An alternative scenario aims to deceive the system operator in order to
shed loads from healthy sensitive locations. The attacker targets the disturbance voltage
at a specific bus to give the appearance of negligible voltage dips. Meanwhile, the attacker
misleadingly shows a different subset of buses that have high voltage dips. In response,
the control system operator applies the load shedding at the new subset of buses.
This scenario can be demonstrated in two parallel steps: (1) The attacker manipulates
the power flow measurements to increase the voltages at bus subsets {39, 8, 7}, as shown
in Table 3.4. (2) The attacker manipulates the measurements such that the control system
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Table 3.2: No attack load shedding distribution
Bus i Vpd,i (pu) Vd,i (pu) ∆Vi (pu) Pshed,i (MW)
39 1.004328 0.858811 0.145517 500
8 0.983386 0.895909 0.087477 276
7 0.984816 0.900548 0.084268 233
Table 3.3: Attacks targeting load shedding distribution
Bus i Vpd,i (pu) Vd,i (pu) ∆Vi (pu) Pshed,i (MW)
39 1.004328 0.804011 0.200317 545
8 0.983386 0.899909 0.083477 227
7 0.984816 0.900548 0.084268 229




















































































Figure 3.11: Changing the shedding order
operator sees the voltages at bus subsets {23, 25, 26, 28, 29} as if they have the highest
voltage dip, as shown in Fig. 3.12. As a result, the control center operator sheds the total
load of the latter (step 2) set of buses instead of the former (step 1). Consequently, by
applying this attack scenario, the attacker is able to misguide the control system operator
to shed some sensitive loads that may cause substantial financial losses.
In the above scenarios, even though the attacker has no access to the frequency mea-
surements, they are still able to manipulate power flow measurements and control shedding
distribution by changing the buses’ voltage values.
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Table 3.4: Targeting shedding locations
Bus i Vpd,i (pu) Vd,i (pu) ∆Vi (pu) Pshed,i (MW)
39 1.004328 1.003001 0.001327 Zero
8 0.983386 0.970087 0.013298 Zero
7 0.984816 0.982816 0.002 Zero




















































































Figure 3.12: Changing the shedding buses locations
C. Faking Underfrequency Conditions
Scenario 7: In this scenario, the attacker’s objective is to falsify the voltage profile
perceived by the system operator in order to match the expected behaviour of voltage
variations. First, the attacker simulates a disturbance and considers the voltage deviations
across all buses. Second, the attacker calculates the deviation index Di from (3.38) and
compares it with the pre-determined threshold γ in order to define the attack bus’s subset
Ωa. Figure 3.13 shows the number of buses which have a specific voltage variation threshold
γ for three test cases of 0.05, 0.08, and 0.125 p.u. For each γ, bus i ∈ Ωa if Di ≥ ∆V .
Table C.2 shows three cases of defined thresholds γ in p.u. voltages. For a threshold of
0.05 p.u., bus 34 exceeds the threshold in voltage variation, while only three buses exceed
the threshold for 0.125 p.u. For each case, a bus i is selected that belongs to the subset
Ωa and a bus j if it doesn’t belong. Figure 3.14 depicts case 3. The first graph shows
bus 18, which belongs to subset Ωa, as D18 exceeds the threshold of 0.125. On the other
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Figure 3.13: Number of buses ∈ Ωa as function of threshold variation
Table 3.5: γ in p.u voltages
Case
#





1 0.05 34 18 34 0.0627 0.0389
2 0.08 13 6 17 0.1148 0.0586
3 0.125 3 9 13 0.1464 0.0985
side, D34 does not exceed the threshold, therefore the received voltage of that bus matches
the results from the state estimation process. Similarly, Fig. 3.15 and Fig.3.16 show the
difference in voltage profile for the buses pairs 6,17 and 9,13 to compare the voltage profile
for a bus that belongs to Ωa (6,9), and buses that do not (17,13).
Scenario 8: Following the same approach of manipulating both frequency and power
flow measurements, the attacker can mask a real disturbance that occurs in the system.
In this scenario, individual frequency values are falsified by adding (60 − fi) to the fre-
quency signals, such that the control center perceives all frequency values closely around
the corresponding optimal value. This is demonstrated in Fig. 3.18, where the faked fre-
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(a) Alteration of Bus 18 to match disturbance voltage profile
















(b) Un-attacked bus 34 voltage profile matches state estimation
Figure 3.14: Voltage profile for Buses in attack subset
quency measurements show the system frequency to be around 60 Hz, whereas in reality
the frequency is dropping.
3.5 Summary
FDI attacks represent a real challenge to the cyber-physical security of modern WAMPAC
schemes. In this chapter, it was shown that an attacker can launch a cyber attack on a
power system during its steady-state and/or small/large disturbance conditions. The at-
tacker can target the operation of the AGC during small dynamics in the power system
or the operation of WAUFLS schemes during large disturbances. Simulations on practical
systems were done to prove the severity of this problem. In the following chapters, de-
tection and mitigation techniques are proposed to address these serious issues and fill the
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(a) Alteration of Bus 6 to match disturbance voltage profile

















(b) Un-attacked bus 17 voltage profile matches state estimation
Figure 3.15: Voltage profile for Buses in attack subset
gaps in the literature that were mentioned in Chapter 2.
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(a) Bus 9 ∈ Ωa and attacked (perceived) voltage (VFDI) matches disturbance voltage (VDist)


















(b) Bus 13 6∈ Ωa and attacked (perceived) voltage (VFDI) matches state estimation voltage (VSE)
Figure 3.16: Voltage profile for Buses in attack subset













Figure 3.17: System frequency response after faking the disturbance
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Figure 3.18: Hiding the actual status of the system
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Chapter 4
Detection and Mitigation of False
Data Injection (FDI) in AGC
Systems Considering a Linear Model
The ability to maintain the system frequency within its specified operating limits is
crucial for the stability and proper operation of power systems. Any deviation out of the
permissible frequency range must be well-mitigated by the AGC system, as otherwise it may
result in disruption of operations and/or damage to the power grid equipment. The data
required by the AGC control system are sent to the control center through communication
links, which are susceptible to cyber attacks. Therefore, such AGC systems have to be
well-protected against FDI attacks.
Since mitigation against FDI attacks on AGC systems has been barely touched in the
literature, and the existing techniques do not provide formal proof of system stability
after incorporating the attack mitigation, this chapter focuses on these concerns. In the
chapter, a Kalman filter-based method is used to detect FDI attacks on AGC systems. In
addition, the use of a simultaneous input and state estimation-based algorithm to detect
and concurrently compensate for FDI attacks against AGC systems is investigated. Formal
proofs for the stability of the system after incorporating the attack mitigation scheme and
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the unbiasedness of the estimated signals are discussed in detail. Note that this chapter
considers the linear model of the AGC system, while the nonlinearities are considered in
Chapter 5.
4.1 Detection of FDI Attacks Using a Kalman Filter
One method for detecting attacks in a system is to compare the behavior of that system
with another identical one that is not under attack. Naturally, this approach is not feasible
in power systems. An alternative method is to analyze the behavior of the system over
time using a mathematical model which predicts how the system is supposed to behave
under no attack. The estimated observations are then compared with the ones obtained
from the actual sensor readings. A significant deviation between them would indicate the
presence of an attack. This approach is known as analytical redundancy. Kalman filtering
[55, 56, 78] is an algorithm that produces accurate estimates of unknown variables using a
series of measurements (possibly noisy) observed over time.
4.1.1 Principle of Operation
In order to estimate the states of the system, the following observation equation is
considered: [120,121]
yk = Cxk + vk, (4.1)
where vk denotes the measurement’s noise. The iterations of the Kalman filter can be
written as:
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Pk|k = Pk|k−1 −KkCkPk|k−1 (4.5)
x̂k = x̂k|k−1 +Kk(yk − Ckx̂k|k−1) (4.6)
The Kalman gain converges in few steps, where the Kalman filter equation can be
updated as:
x̂k+1 = Ax̂k +Buk +K[yk+1 − C(Ax̂k +Buk)] (4.7)
where P , limk→∞ Pk|k−1 and K = PC>(CPC> + R)−1. Then, the residual rk+1 at time
k + 1 is defined as:
rk+1 , yk+1 − C(Ax̂k +Buk) (4.8)
One way to detect the attacks is to calculate the Mahalanobis norm of the residual
vector gk as:
gk = rk × Φ× r>k (4.9)
where Φ denotes the covariance matrix of rk. Then, the detector compares gk with a
predefined threshold which is chosen based on the historical values of gk without an attack.
In a stateful test, an additional statistic Sk, which keeps track of the historical changes
of rk (no matter how small it is), is calculated. An alert is generated if Sk ≥ τ , i.e., if
there is a persistent deviation across multiple time-steps. Many tests can keep track of the
historical behavior of the residual rk, such as taking an average over a time window, an
exponential weighted moving average Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA),
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or using change detection statistics like the non-parametric CUmulative SUM (CUSUM)
statistic.
In this work, the applicability of these stateful approaches is illustrated by using a non-
parametric CUSUM, which is basically a sum of the residuals. In this case, the CUSUM
statistic is defined recursively as S0 = 0 and Sk+1 = (Sk + |rk| − δ)+, where |x|+ represents
max(0, x) and δ is selected so that the expected value of |rk − δ| < 0 when there is no
attack. An alert is generated whenever the statistic is greater than a previously defined
threshold Skτ and the test is restarted with Sk+1 = 0 [122, 123]. In other words, in each
iteration, the most recent m values of the residual is used to calculate the moving average
of the accumulating residual. Compared to other approaches that use the value of the
residual itself, this approach improves the speed of attack detection, especially for cases
where the effect of the attack takes place gradually, e.g., for (small slope) ramp attacks.
4.1.2 Simulation Results
In practice, the covariance matrices for the process noise and the measurement noise
can be determined by performing some actual field measurements from the power system
itself. However, for the purpose of our simulations, the components of wk and vk are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed Gaussian random variables with a
zero mean and a standard deviation of σ = 10−5.
The utilized Kalman filter is tested without any attack to confirm its ability to estimate
different state variables accurately. To perform this, a load disturbance of 0.1785 pu at
t = 0 is applied to Area 1. A sample of the Kalman filter output is depicted in Fig. 4.1,
which shows the measured versus estimated values of the frequency deviation in Area 1 as
well as the tie-line power flow. The solid lines show the estimated values, while the dashed
ones indicate the actual measured ones.
Figure 4.2 shows the Mahalanobis norm gk and the CUSUM Sk samples of the system
with no attacks. As can be seen, the threshold, which is chosen based on the historical
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(a) Frequency deviation in Area 1













(b) Tie-line power deviation
Figure 4.1: State estimation under normal operation (no attack)
behavior of the residual values, is higher than the maximum value of these residuals in a
case of no attack. In our simulations, it is chosen to be 10−5.










Figure 4.2: Residual of the output with no attack
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To confirm the detection capabilities of the proposed solution, different attacks are
constructed and applied to the AGC system. These attacks target both measurements and
control signals of the AGC system, e.g., frequency deviation signals, tie-line power signals,
and ACE signal. A normal load disturbance of 0.1785 pu is applied in Area 1 at t = 0 sec.
The attacks target both measurements and control signals. In the presented two scenarios,
the attacks are applied at t = 5 sec.
Scenario 1: A scaling attack with a scaling parameter of 1.25 is applied to the reading
of the frequency deviation in Area 1, ∆f1, as shown in Fig. 4.3a. An alarm trigger signal
appears at the moment of the attack, as shown in Fig. 4.3b.














(a) Frequency deviation in Area 1












(b) Mahalanobis norm of error vector gk and CUSUM Sk
Figure 4.3: Scaling attack on ∆f1
Scenario 2: In this scenario, a ramp signal with a slope of 0.005 is used to manipulate
the signal ∆Ptie. Figure 4.4a, which also includes the true signal, shows the effect of the
attack. As illustrated in Fig. 4.4b, the error residual increases gradually until it hits the
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predetermined threshold as an indication of the attack. In this case, the attack is applied
at t = 5 sec, and the residual norm detector detects it later when the residual value exceeds
the threshold value. This is due to the nature of the ramp attack whose effect increases
gradually; a ramp attack with a higher slope will be detected faster. The figure also shows
how the use of the CUSUM stateful approach improves the detection time in this case.





























(b) Mahalanobis norm of error vector gk and CUSUM Sk
Figure 4.4: Ramp attack on ∆Ptie
4.2 Mitigation Using Joint Input and State Estima-
tion Algorithm
Despite the simplicity of the Kalman Filter solution presented above, in practice, it is
not enough to detect the occurrence of FDI attacks. In other words, the attacked sensors
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cannot be isolated because the AGC system needs these readings in order to perform its
required real-time control operation accurately. To address this deficiency, an input/state
estimation-based algorithm [124,125] is utilized to detect and simultaneously compensate
for FDI attacks on AGC systems. The discrete-time linear system with the attack signals
can be represented as:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +Gdk + ωk (4.10)
yk = Cxk +Duk +Hdk + vk (4.11)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector at time k, uk ∈ Rm is the natural system disturbance,
dk ∈ Rp is the FDI vector, and yk ∈ Rl is the measurement vector. For the two-area AGC















0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0

In this model, the FDI vector is treated as the unknown input. In other words, dk is
fed to the algorithm as an unknown input in order to estimate it. The process noise ωk
and the measurement noise vk are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated, zero-mean, white
Gaussian noise with known covariance matrices, Qk and Rk, respectively.
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4.2.1 Algorithm Description
A three-step recursive filter is used, as shown in Algorithm 1. The three steps are time
update, measurement update, and the estimation of the unknown input. In the first step,
measurements up to time k−1 are given, the next state is predicted using Equation (4.12),
and the error in the propagated state estimation and its covariance matrix is calculated.
In the second step, the propagated estimate x̂k|k−1 is updated using the measurement yk,
as in Equation (4.13), and the covariance matrix P xk|k of the updated state estimate error is
obtained. Finally, in the last step, the unknown input is estimated, as shown in Equation
(4.14).
x̂k|k−1 = Ax̂k−1|k−1 +Buk−1 +Gd̂k−1 (4.12)
x̂k|k = x̂k|k−1 + Lk(yk − Cx̂k|k−1)−Duk) (4.13)
d̂k = Mk(yk − Cx̂k|k −Duk) (4.14)
After estimating the FDI, the value of the estimated signal d̂k is subtracted from the
received one to compensate for the attack and estimate the system state at time k, as shown
in Fig. 3.1. This algorithm can be thought of as a generalization of the Kalman filter [125]
and can be utilized to simultaneously perform detection, estimation, and compensation in
FDI attacks.
4.2.2 Simulation Results
The above algorithm is tested under different attack scenarios. In each of the following
scenarios, an attack in the form of a false data injection is applied to one of the communi-
cation signals of ∆f1, ∆f2 or ∆Ptie. The figures show the actual versus estimated attacks.
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Algorithm 1 Unknown Input and State Estimation [124,125]
1: Initialize: x̂0|0 = E[x0]; d̂0 = H†(y0 − Cx̂0|0 −Du0); P x0|0 = Px0 ;P xd0 = Pxd0 ;P d0 = Pd0 ;
2: for k = 1 to N do
. Time update
3: x̂k|k−1 = Ax̂k−1|k−1 +Buk−1 +Gd̂k−1;
















7: Lk = Kk(I −H(H>R̃−1k H)−1H>R̃−1k );
8: x̂k|k = x̂k|k−1 + Lk(yk − Cx̂k|k−1)−Duk);
9: P xk|k = (I − CLk)P xk|k−1(I − CLk)> + LkRkL>k ;
. Estimation of unknown inputs
10: R̃?k = (I − CLk)R̃k(I − CLk)>;
11: P dk = (H
>R̃?−1k H)
−1;




13: d̂k = Mk(yk − Cx̂k|k −Duk);
14: P xdk = −P xk|kC>M>k + LkRkM>k ;
15: end for
They also show the true, the manipulated, and the compensated communication sensor
readings. The simulation start time is the time of occurrence of the physical disturbance
of the system (e.g., load increase/decrease or generator tripping). The duration of the
attack is chosen by the attacker in order to drive the AGC system out of control or de-
ceive the control center into making the wrong decision (e.g., trigger under-/over-frequency
protection devices without a need to do so).
Recall that the AGC regulates grid frequency by adjusting the set-points of a power
plant’s governors. To calculate these set-points, the control center receives sensor readings,
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i.e., frequency and tie-line power measurements from different areas. It is impossible to
exhaust all FDI injection patterns. Throughout our work, the FDI attack signal is modeled
as an additive signal which is added to the sensor readings. While this additive signal
can be of any value, throughout the literature, ramp, pulse and step attack signals are
usually used [80] to test different attack scenarios, as they model slowly varying attacks,
attacks of short duration, and attacks that aim to cause a sudden variation in the system.
Furthermore, stealthy attacks also have to satisfy the constraints imposed by equations (1)
and (2).
Scenario 1: In this scenario, under steady-state conditions, i.e., with no system load
disturbance, a pulse signal that has a magnitude of 0.002 is used to manipulate the fre-
quency deviation in Area 1, ∆f1, as shown in Fig. 4.5. Figure 4.5a shows the actual and
estimated attacks. Figures 4.5b, 4.5c and 4.5d show the true, attacked, and compensated
signals for ∆f1, ∆f2 and ∆Ptie, respectively. As depicted in Fig. 4.5c, the system operator
sees the frequency at Area 2 lower than its actual value. This may drive the system oper-
ator to use the UFLS schemes, if the frequency comes below a specific value, which may
result in shedding loads when there is no need to do so.
Scenario 2: Under a system disturbance of 0.2 pu at Area 1, a step attack is applied
to the signal ∆f1 starting at t = 10 sec. The magnitude of the step is 0.003. Figure 4.6a
shows that the attack is well-estimated with reasonable accuracy. The other sub-figures of
Fig. 4.6 show the true, attacked, and mitigated system signals.
Scenario 3: A system disturbance of 0.2 pu is applied to Area 1 at t = 0 sec. At
the same time, a ramp attack with a slope of 0.0001 is applied to the signal ∆f2. Fig-
ure 4.7 shows the attack estimation as well as the system performance with and without
compensated measurements.
Scenario 4: At t = 0 sec, a system disturbance of 0.15 pu takes place at Area 2. At
t = 10 sec, a step signal with a magnitude of -0.02 is used to manipulate the value of
∆Ptie. Figure 4.8 shows the attack estimation as well as the system performance with and
without compensated measurements.
Scenario 5: In this scenario, a case where the attacker targets more than one signal
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in the communication system is considered. At t = 0 sec, a system disturbance of -0.2 pu
takes place at Area 2. At the same time, a ramp attack with a slope of 0.0001 is applied
to ∆f1. At t = 10 sec, a pulse signal with a magnitude of 0.01 is used to manipulate the
value of ∆Ptie. Figure 4.9 shows the simulation results corresponding to this scenario.
To address the applicability of the proposed approach to real-world scenarios, the pro-
posed algorithm is also simulated under different types of attacks in a 12-bus, four-area
system with multi-generator units in each area. The 12-bus model utilized in this study
is practical and comes from North America, representing the Manitoba Chicago network.
(See Fig. 4.10). The data for this system is taken from [126, 127] and is summarized in
Table A.2.
Scenario 6: To show the effect of FDI injections at transient conditions, a pulse attack
with a magnitude of 0.003 is injected to the signal of the frequency deviation in Area 4,
∆f4 at t = 15 sec, when the system is under a natural system disturbance of 0.2 pu at
Area 2. Figure 4.11 shows the attack estimation and mitigation as well as its effect on the
attacked signal.
Scenario 7: Figure 4.12 shows a scenario where a ramp attack that starts at t = 15
sec with a rising slope of 0.0005 is used to manipulate the signal ∆Ptie13. The FDI takes
place under a system disturbance of 0.15 pu at Area 3.
Scenario 8: In this scenario, the attacker manipulates both ∆f1 and ∆Ptie34. The
attacker injects a ramp signal with a slope of 0.0002 at t = 0 sec to ∆f1. Then, at t = 15
sec, the attacker injects a step signal with a magnitude of 0.03 to ∆Ptie34. Figure 4.13
shows the attack’s estimation and mitigation in different system signals.
All of the above-presented simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed
approach in estimating the value of the injected attack signals under different operating
conditions and attack scenarios and successfully compensating for it so that the AGC
system can continue its normal operation.
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4.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Mitigation Technique
4.3.1 Impact of Noise
To illustrate the impact of the sensor noise, Fig. 4.14 shows Scenario 7 with a higher
value for the sensor noise, σ = 10−2.5. As can be seen, the proposed algorithm is capable
of mitigating the attack even in the presence of this relatively high sensor noise.
4.3.2 Estimation Accuracy
The accuracy of the estimation is guaranteed through the use of the utilized optimal
filter (see Theorems 2, 3 below). On the other hand, if the estimation accuracy is im-
pacted because of any unforeseen reason in practice, this inaccuracy would then lead to
some degradation in the system performance. To illustrate this, a hypothetical form of
Scenario 7 is simulated (see Fig. 4.15) to show the behavior of the system under an inaccu-
rate estimation process. The inaccuracy is modeled by adding independent and identically
distributed Gaussian random noise with zero mean and a standard deviation of 10−5 and
10−3.5 to each component of the estimated state x̂ and estimated attack signal d̂, respec-
tively.
Another scenario that shows how the controller may make a wrong decision is the
case where the model used in the state/attack estimation algorithm (Algorithm 1) is not
accurate. This inaccuracy was simulated by uniformly perturbing the elements of the
matrices Ac and Bc. We do so by multiplying each element of these matrices by 1+r, where
r ∈ [−ε,+ε] is a uniformly distributed random variable and ε denotes the perturbation
percentage. In practice, this might occur if there is an error in the process modeling or in
the linearizion of the original model. Figure 4.16 shows the system response under a ramp
attack for a model perturbation ε = 20%. As illustrated by the figure, there is a deviation
between the actual attack signal and the estimated one. This affects the mitigation process,
in that the control center may initiate the UFLS protection scheme at t = 205 sec when
the estimated value for the mitigated frequency f4 reaches 59.7 Hz.
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4.4 Features of Proposed Mitigation Technique
It should be noted that the sufficient conditions required for the boundedness of the
error covariance of the used input and state estimator and its exponential stability are
satisfied for the systems considered throughout our work. By invoking the separation
principle [128], this also implies the stability of the overall system. More precisely, the
following properties have been verified for the considered two-area and four-area AGC
system models.
4.4.1 Strong Detectability
A linear time-invariant discrete-time system is strongly detectable if and only if:
rankP (z) := rank
[
zI − A −G
C H
]
= n+ p,∀z ∈ C, |z| ≥ 1 (4.15)
The exponential stability of the filter is directly related to the strong detectability of the
time-varying system, without which unbiased state and input estimates cannot be obtained,
even in the absence of stochastic noise [125]. The considered AGC models are confirmed
to be strongly detectable by verifying that the above condition holds. Note that the above
condition is equivalent to the system being minimum-phase (i.e., the invariant zeros of P(z)
are stable).
4.4.2 Exponential Stability
Algorithm 1 can be considered as a special case of the algorithm presented in [125].
In the general case considered in [125], no assumption is made on H to be either a zero
matrix (no direct feedthrough) or to have full column rank when there is direct feedthrough.













where Σ ∈ RPH×PH is a diagonal matrix of full rank, U1 ∈ Rl×PH , U2 ∈ Rl×(l−PH), V1 ∈
RP×PH and V2 ∈ RP×(P−PH). In that case, the following theorem applies.
Theorem 1 [125]: For a linear time-invariant system, if (Ã, Q̃0.5) is stabilizable, Algo-
rithm 1 in [125] is exponentially stable, i.e., the expected estimate errors decay exponen-
tially.
In the above theorem, Ã and Q̃ are defined (using the notation introduced in [125]) as:
Ã = (I −G2M̃2C2)Â+G2M̃2C2


















In our case, the direct feedback matrix H is a full-rank matrix. Thus, H can be
rewritten as:
H = UΣV > (4.19)
where Σ ∈ Rp×p. In other words, the matrices U2 and V2 vanish, and consequently all the
corresponding matrices C2, G2, and M̃2 also vanish, i.e., these matrices will correspond to
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empty matrices (an empty matrix is one in which the number of rows or columns [or both]




Thus, for the particular case where rank(H) = p, which corresponds to our case, the
following corollary applies:
Corollary 1 If (Â, Q̂0.5) is stabilizable, Algorithm 1 is exponentially stable, i.e., the ex-
pected estimate errors decay exponentially.
4.4.3 Unbiasedness
Using the notation in Algorithm 1, the following theorems, from [124], show the con-
dition for Algorithm 1 to provide the unbiased estimation of both the state and the input
of the system.
Theorem 2 [124]: The minimum-variance unbiased state estimator is obtained with the




>R̃−1(I −H(H>R̃−1k H)−1H>R̃−1k (4.21)
where R̃k := CP
x
k|k−1C
>+Rk, if and only if (H
>R̃−1k H) is nonsingular, i.e. rank(H) = p.
Theorem 3 [124]: Let x̂k|k be unbiased, then the input estimate given by line 13 in
Algorithm 1, is unbiased if and only if MkH = I, and consequently, rank(H) = p.
It follows that the condition rank(H) = p, which is satisfied in our case, is a necessary




In this chapter, an approach to detect FDI attacks on AGC systems was proposed. Be-
cause detection of FDI only is not enough, another approach that jointly detects, estimates,
and compensates for FDI attacks against AGC systems was presented. The utilized in-
put/state estimation-based algorithm considered the FDI as unknown input and estimated
its value accordingly. The estimated values for the FDI were then used to compensate for
the effect of the attack in real time so that the AGC system could continue its operation un-
der attack until the main reasons for the attack could be eliminated. The simulation results
for two-area and four-area practical systems confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed
approach against different forms of FDI attacks. It should be noted that such an analytical
redundancy solution is not meant to replace cyber-based intrusion detection systems, and
that it should be thought of as a solution which provides another layer of defense against
FDI attacks on AGC systems. One should also note that the proposed approach is generic
enough to be applied to mitigate FDI attacks in other smart grid security applications.
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(a) Pulse attack with a magnitude of 0.002
















(b) Frequency deviation at Area 1
















(c) Frequency deviation at Area 2




















Figure 4.5: Pulse attack at steady-state condition
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(a) Step attack with a magnitude of 0.001

















(b) Frequency deviation at Area 1
Figure 4.6: Step attack at system disturbance condition
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(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.001
















(b) Frequency deviation at Area 2
Figure 4.7: Ramp attack at system disturbance condition
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(a) Step attack with a magnitude of -0.02

















Figure 4.8: Step attack at system disturbance condition
81
























(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.001 to ∆f1
























(b) Pulse attack with a magnitude of 0.01 to ∆Ptie
















(c) Frequency deviation at Area 1


















Figure 4.9: Combined attack 1 at system disturbance condition
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Figure 4.10: 4-Area Manitoba Chicago network























(a) Pulse attack with a magnitude of 0.003 to ∆f4
















(b) Frequency deviation at Area 4
Figure 4.11: Pulse attack at system disturbance condition
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(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.0005 against ∆Ptie13


















(b) Tie-line 1-3 power
Figure 4.12: Ramp attack at system disturbance condition
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(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.0002 against ∆f1





















(b) Step attack with a magnitude of 0.03 against ∆Ptie34

















(c) Frequency deviation in Area 4


















(d) Tie-line 3-4 power
Figure 4.13: Combined attack 2 at system disturbance condition
85





















(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.0005 against ∆Ptie13


















(b) Tie-line 1-3 power
Figure 4.14: Estimation and mitigation of a ramp attack in the presence of large sensor noise
(σ = 10−2.5)
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(a) Ramp attack with a slope of 0.0005 against ∆Ptie13


















(b) Tie-line 1-3 power
Figure 4.15: System performance with inaccurate estimation for a ramp attack
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Estimated value without model perturbation
Estimated value with model perturbation
Actual value
(a) Estimation of ramp attack














Mitigated value without model perturbation
Mitigated value with model perturbation
Signal with attack (received signal)
Signal without attack (actual signal)
UFLS operates
(b) Frequency deviation at Area 4
Figure 4.16: Effect of inaccurate model estimation (20% perturbation of model parameters)
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Chapter 5
Detection and Mitigation of False
Data Injection (FDI) in AGC
Systems Considering Nonlinearities
None of the previous works considered the nonlinearity of AGC systems, which means
that the proposed solutions are only effective under the over-simplified assumed linearity
of the AGC model. Because AGC nonlinearities rarely occur, the consequences of such an
attack can be catastrophic, as none of the existing approaches that depend on the linear
model will be able to detect or mitigate it. In this chapter, the work proposed in Chapter
4 is extended to address this deficiency and propose a new approach to detect and identify
FDI attacks on AGC systems by considering three types of AGC nonlinearities.
5.1 AGC Nonlinearities and System Model
The nonlinearities of the AGC systems include but are not limited to the following:
• Dead-band of Speed Governor (GDB): If the absolute difference between gov-
ernor power and disturbance power is lower than the dead band’s value, the dead
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band’s output for the next control cycle remains constant. If it is higher, the dead
band’s output for the next control cycle is equal to the governor power [129,130].
• Generation Rate Constraints (GRC): In power systems with thermal plants,
power generation can be changed only at a specified maximum rate. The generation
rate for reheat turbines is very low. If these constraints are not considered, the
system is likely to chase large momentary disturbances, resulting in undue wear and
tear on the controller. It is thus extremely important to understand the influence of
GRC in the AGC problem. GRCs result in larger deviations in ACEs, as the rate
at which generation can change in the area is constrained by the limits imposed.
Therefore, the duration for which power needs to be imported increases considerably
in comparison to cases where the generation rate is not constrained [131].
• Transportation Delay Time (∆T ): This results from the delay in the communi-
cation system as well as the delay in the response of the mechanical system.
To show the effectiveness of the aforementioned nonlinearities on the response of AGC
system, the previous 2-area AGC system is updated as shown in Fig. 5.1 and tested with
and without including the nonlinearities under similar disturbance conditions. In this work,
the values of ∆T and Dead-band of Speed Governor (GDB) are adopted from [130] as 2
sec and 0.036 Hz, respectively, for both areas. In addition, the GRC is modeled similar
to [130]. The simulated disturbance is a load increase of 0.18 pu in Area 1.
Figure 5.2 shows the differences in the main AGC signals that the control center opera-
tor use to make a decision e.g. frequency deviations and tie-line power. It can be seen that
the response of AGC is completely different if the nonlinearities are considered. In other
words, the control decision that is to be made based on the red signals (with nonlinearities)
is totally different than that made based on the red signals (linear model response). This
appears clearly in Fig. 5.3 in the ACE signals that are used to calculate the new operating
point for each region.
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Figure 5.1: AGC model of a two-area system, including nonlinearities.
5.2 Detecting, Classifying and Identifying FDI At-
tacks on AGC Systems Using Recurrent Neural
Networks
5.2.1 Recurrent Neural Networks
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) is a special type of neural network by which a
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(a) Frequency deviation in Area 1















(b) Frequency deviation in Area 2



















Figure 5.2: System response with and without nonlinearities
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(a) Area 1 control error




















(b) Area 2 control error
Figure 5.3: Area control error with and without nonlinearities
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sequence of features (inputs) is mapped to labels (outputs). The RNN uses previous inputs
and outputs to adjust the weights of the networks, thus creating a memory to improve its
performance [132]. The structure of RNN can be mathematically modeled as [1]:
ht = f(ht−1,xt) (5.1)
where ht is the hidden state, ht−1 is the previous hidden state, xt is the current feature
observed, and f is a nonlinear mapping function from the input features to the output
labels. Equation (5.1) presents the essence of RNN and what differentiates it from regular
neural networks. The hidden state ht is used as a memory to capture sequence information.
Figure 5.4 shows the unfolding of RNN during computation.
Figure 5.4: Left: Recursive Description of RNN. Right: Corresponding Extended RNN model
for time sequence [1]
During the training phase, the RNN inputs a stream of data, which it then analyzes by
relating the different input features (signals) and their corresponding labels (presence of
attack and its type). The network screens the sequential data by creating a time window
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of pre-specified number of time steps, and attempts to discern a temporal pattern across
the features and labels in this window. The window slides over the entire sequence of data
and updates the weights accordingly.
RNN employs a gradient descent technique to minimize the network cumulative error,
namely the Back Propagation Through Time (BPTT) algorithm [133] and [134]. BPTT is
an extension of the back propagation algorithm over a time sequence, where the gradient
at each output depends on calculations of current as well as previous steps.
Starting with the RNN model described in Fig. 5.4, parameters are assumed to be the
same across the whole sequence in each time step. This assumption is used to simplify the
gradient calculations [1]. At time t, we have:
ht = tanh(Whhht−1 +Wxhxt + bh) (5.2)
zt = softmax(Whzht + bz) (5.3)
where bh and bz are the bias terms for the hidden state and prediction at time step t. The
softmax function is the used loss function, which is commonly employed as the final layer
in neural networks architecture for multiple class classification. The maximum likelihood
is used to estimate the model parameters, while the minimization of the objective function
of negative log likelihood is [1]:
L(x, y) = −
∑
t
yt log zt (5.4)
where zt is the prediction at time step t. For simplicity, the notation L will be used as
the objective function. The notation L(t) indicates the output at time t while L(t + 1)























= −(yt − zt) (5.6)
The weight Whz between the hidden state h and output z is the same across all time


































The above equation only considers the time step t → t + 1. As the RNN model uses
previous states for subsequent state calculations, the hidden state ht+1 depends partially on














Then, by aggregating gradients with respect to Whh over the whole sequence and using


















The same process applied in (5.7)-(5.11) is also applied to the weights Wxh, by taking


















To validate the approach of using RNN for detecting attacks on the AGC system, typical
statistical measures are applied to diagnose the detection classification ability of the RNN
model, such as accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, and precision calculations. First, RNN is
used as a binary classifier to detect the anomaly (attack) present in the signal, without
differentiating the type of the attack. Secondly, RNN is used to detect the different types
of attacks and identify the attacked signal.
The RNN model employed in the simulations is trained using the following parameters:
1) Input dimension of 5. The input (features) are tie-line power and frequency signals. 2)
Output dimension of 1. The output (labels) represents an indication of attack type and
the attacked signal, if any, for each time step. 3) Batch size of 64. This batch size is
chosen as it outputs the best results over multiple iterations of training. 4) Epoch size of
100. The model did not improve results for an epoch number greater than 100. 5) An
RMSprop optimizer is chosen, as it provides superior performance in RNN models with
similar objectives [135]. The model is implemented using the Keras RNN-LSTM stacked
architecture [136].
The predictions of both detection and identification models can be analyzed by consid-
ering the two (four) possibilities for each output label l ∈ L, i.e., attack detection (attack
location), by considering an output l as positive and all others output as negative: (1) True
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Positive (TP) describes a positive prediction of an actual positive case, (2) True Negative
(TP) describes a negative prediction of an actual negative case, (3) False Positive (FP)
describes a positive prediction of an actual negative case, and (4) False Negative (FN) de-
scribes a negative prediction of an actual positive case. Based on these possible outcomes,
the following four statistical metrics are introduced:
Accuracy =
TP + TN














where the Accuracy metric measures the probability of classifying fault cases correctly and
is a general indicator of the overall classifier performance; the Precision metric measures
the probability of correct positive classification, and is an indicator of the confidence in
the predicted positive cases; the Recall metric demonstrates the probability of correct
classification in all positive labels, and is an indicator of ability to predict positive cases;
and finally the f1 Score represents the balance between the Precision and Recall.
The training data are generated using the results of 3,000 different scenarios for the
AGC under normal operation (no attacks) as well as under different types of attacks. The
results in tables 5.1 and 5.2 are based on a validation data set composed of 192,000 data
samples taken from the 3,000 simulated scenarios. These data points are presented as one
long stream of data, simulating the data that is gathered by the data center. In both cases,
a threshold window limit kT is implemented to count a detection or the identification of
the attack. For an attack at time step T = T0, the RNN should detect the attack at
T ≤ T0 +KT , in order to count as a valid detection. For our simulations, KT = 10 is used,
which represents one second in real time.
The results confirm the capability of RNN to detect with high statistical measures, in
less than one second of the attack, given a sample time rate of 10 ms. The model achieves
a precision rate of 99.01, 99.22 and 99.43 in the detection, classification and identification
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tasks, respectively. The RNN performance measure is on par with accuracy metrics of other
data-driven machine learning models used in related power system problems [135, 137].
After attack detection, the attacks are identified to be in ∆f1 (Signal ’1’), ∆f2 (Signal ’2’)
or ∆Ptie (Signal ’3’). The following case studies show simulations where our approach is
tested under different types of attacks.
Table 5.1: Performance Table for RNN Detector
Criteria Score
Number of data samples 192000
True Positive (TP) 117429
False Positive (FP) 1174
True Negative (TN) 64425





Table 5.2: Performance Table for RNN identifier
Criteria Score
Number of data samples 192000
True Positive (TP) 117678
False Positive (FP) 925
True Negative (TN) 64425






In our case studies, the parameters of the previously mentioned attacks (e.g., magni-
tude, and rate of change) are selected carefully such that the attack is hidden and bypasses
the bad data detectors in the control system. To be more precise, the measurements should
not change significantly over a short period. Intuitively, if each element of the FDI attack
vector is bounded around zero, these bad data detectors, designed to be insensitive to
natural random noises in the measurements, will not be changed [53]. The parameters
have to be selected such that the attack creates the desired impact and at the same time
does not trigger any data quality alarms in the control center.
Case 1: Pulse attack to ∆f2 In this case, under a system disturbance of 0.15 pu in
Area 1, the signal ∆f2 is manipulated using a pulse signal with a magnitude of 0.2. The
attack, which started at T = 20sec. Fig. 5.5, shows that the proposed approach detected
the attack in less than 1 sec. Also, the attack is classified as Type ’1’ and is identified to
be in ∆f2. A sample of the tested case studies that show the detection and classification
processes is given below.
Case 2: Ramp attack to ∆Ptie Under a system disturbance of 0.2 pu in Area 2, a
ramp signal with a slope of 0.001 is injected in the signal of ∆Ptie at t = 5sec. Figure 5.6
shows that the attack is detected in Signal ’3’ at t = 5.7sec and classified as a Type ’2’
attack.
5.3 Mitigation Using Load Forecast
In scenarios where an attack is detected while the AGC is working in the nonlinear
region, the attack detection technique based on RNN will be effective to detect, classify
and identify the attack. However, the mitigation technique, described in the previous
chapter can no longer be trusted. The control center will be “flying blind” while trying to
match the load and generation. Therefore, there is a need to use a technique that makes
an educated guess based on system knowledge and appropriately issues ACE commands
to generators without the need for system measurements.
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Attack onset T= 20 sec
(a) Frequency deviation in Area 1





















Figure 5.5: Pulse attack to ∆f2
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Attack onset T=15 sec
(a) Tie-line power



















Figure 5.6: Ramp attack to ∆Ptie
102
In the literature, regression models, neural networks and statistical learning algorithms
are used to calculate real-time load forecasts. Weather forecasts, seasonal effects and other
factors are considered in these approaches to arrive at a load forecast. Generally speaking,
making the decisions based on load forecast might not be accurate, as discussed in section
2.3.1. In addition, the accuracy of the proposed mitigation scheme in the previous chapter
is sufficient in case the AGC is working in the linear region. Therefore, in this work, the
mitigation-based load forecast algorithm mentioned in [80] is suitable to be used if an
attack is detected by the particle filter or RNN, and only if the AGC is working in the
nonlinear region. In this case, only the attacked signal can be calculated using the load
forecast after it has been identified using the RNN identifier.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, the effect of AGC nonlinearities was included. RNN-based method was
proposed for detecting and identifying attacks on AGC systems. Different attack templates
representing different types of data manipulation were discussed and simulated and various
attack scenarios were applied. The proposed detection techniques were able to detect all of
them. The results confirmed the capability of RNN for detecting and identifying different
types of attacks with high statistical measures in less than one second of the attack’s onset.
The first step was developing an RNN detector, and then adapting the model in order to
identify the location of the attack. The RNN model achieved a precision rate of 99.01 and
99.22 in the detection and identification tasks, respectively.
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Chapter 6
Mitigating False Data Injection
(FDI) Attacks on Wide-Area
Under-Frequency Load Shedding
(WAUFLS) Schemes
Relying solely on the value of ROCOF to evaluate system disturbances makes the
current WAUFLS schemes vulnerable to cyber attacks, as shown in section 3.4. They are
also inaccurate in small systems, as system inertia changes if one of the generators is tripped
[102]. In addition, using the swing equation to determine the magnitude of disturbance is
valid only at the moment of disturbance and does not give a real-time monitoring of system
mismatch [105]. In this chapter, a new WAUFLS scheme that overcomes these drawbacks
inherent in the current schemes is proposed. Because it works based on trusted system
states, it is able to evaluate system disturbances accurately, even if there are FDI attacks
on the frequency signals.
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6.1 Description of the Proposed WAUFLS Scheme
The proposed scheme calculates power mismatches using dynamic power flow analysis.
However, the data used to run the dynamic power flow must be obtained from a trusted
source. Therefore, PSSE represents an in-between layer that processes system measure-
ments and provides trusted data, using the proposed measurement classification-based
method explained in Section 6.2, that can be used in the power flow.
The logic of the proposed scheme is depicted in a flowchart in Fig. 6.1. First, the
frequency and power flow measurements are received from various sensors and PMUs in
the system. Then, the frequency of center of inertia (fc) is calculated and compared to
a predefined threshold (Fmin). A value less than the threshold means that there is an
under-frequency condition in the system due to a disturbance. At that point, power flow
measurements are used to run the PSSE, and trusted system states (V and δ at each bus)
are obtained.
The next step is to use these trusted states to run a dynamic power flow that calculates
the power mismatch caused by the disturbance. Based on the calculated mismatch, a load
shedding process is performed. After shedding the needed load amount, fc is calculated
based on the updated values for system frequency measurements and compared with the
nominal value of system frequency (Fn). Finally, if fc < Fn, the updated power flow
measurements are used to repeat the Power System State Estimation-Power Flow (PSSE-
PF) process until the system frequency returns to its nominal value. It is worth mentioning
that the topology of the system should be updated as needed, prior to running both PSSE
and the power flow. In the following subsections, the used models of PSSE as well as
dynamic power flow are described.
6.2 Securing PSSE using Measurement Classification
In order to run the PSSE, the control center operator relies on PFMs that guarantee
system observability. In practice, the system operator has access to redundant PFMs which
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generate a high number of essential sets [60]. The proposed mitigation method depends on
two main steps: i) securing only the subset of critical PFMs, and ii) employing different
PFMs for running the PSSE. By securing only the critical PFMs, we minimize the cost of
securing the power network. Furthermore, by employing a different observable (essential)
PFMs set, the attacker has virtually zero chance of knowing the PFMs to attack. Therefore,
any attempted attack will be easily detected by the PSSE BDD.
For the PSSE operation, as outlined in Section 3.3, the PFM including voltage V ,
phase angles θ, active power injection Pi, and reactive power injection Qi, which can be
obtained from the sensors installed at each bus. This is in addition to active and reactive
power flow values which can be obtained from the sensors installed at the transmission
lines. Therefore, the maximum possible number of PFM that can be obtained in a system
is Nmax = 4N + 2b where N is the number of buses and b is the number of transmission
lines. Since it impractical to install sensors everywhere in the power system, it is assumed
that the installed sensors provide a set of data A where A ⊂ M and M is the set that
includes all the possible measurements in that system. In this work, the available data set
A can be classified into essential E and non-essential W data subsets i.e., A = E ∪W .
Essential data subset is the minimum number of PFM that is required to achieve system
observablity. Essential data subsets are not unique and many subsets can be identified
for a system based on the number of the available data in the set A. The intersection
of all essential data sets gives a critical data subset C i.e., C = E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ... ∩ En
where n is the maximum number of essential subsets. The critical data subset is a unique
subset of data that is required by the PSSE to converge [60]. This classification is shown in
Fig. 6.2. Using the ith essential subset Ei, the critical PFM for a system can be obtained
















where the rows of hE(x), zE and hW (x), zW correspond to the essential and non essential
measurements, respectively. Applying the Peters-Wilkinson decomposition and substitut-
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ing in (6.1)
ZE = L1.U.x (6.2)
ZW = L2.U.x (6.3)
Eliminating U.x, the linear dependency among the essential and non-essential measure-
ments can be given by (6.5). Hence, an element of zE is critical if the corresponding




zW = T.z1 (6.5)
The proposed mitigation scheme in this work is to install secured communication chan-
nels for all the critical PFM such that the attacker cannot access the measurements included
in the subset C. In addition, given the fact that a number of essential PFM sets can be
identified, a second layer of security can be added if the control center operator selects
-randomly- one of these sets at each run. If it is possible for the attacker to identify these
sets, it is impossible for him/her to know which set is used at the current instant. There-
fore, the attacker will never be able to launch a hidden attack. However, the attacker
can manipulate some measurements and this will be detected easily using the BDD in the
PSSE.
6.3 Calculating the Power Mismatch Using a PSSE-
PF Module
After estimating a trusted vector of system states, including voltage magnitude and
phase angle at each bus, these trusted values are used to run a power flow to calculate
total system mismatch. To capture small changes in the power system during transients, a
second-order power flow model [138] is used to calculate the total power mismatch. For a
system with n buses, the power mismatch at bus i can be defined as the sum of the power
107
flows in all elements, i.e., generators, loads, transmission lines, etc., connected to this bus.



















































where Pi is the active power injection into bus i, δj and Vj are the phase angle and magni-
tude of voltage at bus j, respectively, N is the number of system buses, and ∆ represents





|ViVjYij|cos(δi − δj − θij) (6.7)
where Yij = |Yij|∠θij is the admittance of the transmission line connecting buses i and j.































Finally, the total system mismatch Pmis, which is also equal to the difference between
the total generation PG and the total load PL, is equal to the summation of the single
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mismatch values at each bus and can be evaluated as (6.9). It is worth mentioning that
while system losses can be neglected in large systems, in this work they are included in PL.




6.4 Load Shedding Process
Since the proposed approach performs online monitoring of the amount of power mis-
match, the amount of load to be shed Pshed is the same as the amount of power mismatch
Pmis because the spinning reserve is already embedded in the calculations. This contrasts
with other approaches that require knowledge of the system spinning reserve because they
calculate the magnitude of disturbance, not the actual power mismatch in the system.
To achieve load shedding, a combination of loads is selected such that the sum of their
total active powers is as close as possible to Pshed. There are different criteria by which load
shedding locations can be selected. However, the most common criteria used in wide-area
applications is voltage collapse-based load shedding, as the voltage collapses rapidly after
a disturbance [104,107,109,116–118].
For the sake of subject completeness, the shedding criterion used in the simulations
of this paper will be discussed. The shedding locations are mainly selected based on the
location of disturbance [104]. In other words, the load shedding is distributed between the
buses that are close to the disturbance according to their voltage dip during the disturbance.
All area buses are ranked based on voltage dips. Accordingly, the load shedding at bus i





where ∆Vi is the voltage dip at bus i immediately after the disturbance, and Nv is the
set of buses that have the highest voltage dip. Once the load to be shed is known for all
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buses, the shedding process takes place in steps. It is worth mentioning that the trusted
values of buses voltage are used for this purpose, which means that this process is robust
to cyber attacks.
6.5 Reliability and Accuracy of the Proposed Method
The proposed mitigation approach depends on running the PSSE, which is an essential
operation in the power grid. The approach relies on adding a security layer for the PSSE
process by using secure PFMs. However, this added security layer does not have any sig-
nificant delays in the PSSE scheme. Fig. 6.3 depicts the required number of iterations
for PSSE convergence for different accuracy thresholds, which is the typical number of
iterations for PSSE schemes. In addition, Fig. 6.4 shows the probability of finding an
observable set against employing a specific percentage of available PFMs (with all pos-
sible combinations at this percentage). For example, in the IEEE 39 bus New England
system, of all PFMs sets combination of size 80% of available PFMs, 40% are essential
sets that can be used for PSSE. Therefore, by using different PFMs sets of various sizes,
the probability of the attacker to find the employed essential set drastically diminished,
which highly increases the reliability of the PSSE. As the protection strategy depends on
utilising different observable sets to obtain trusted states from the PSSE, we calculate the
probability of a successful FDI attack (scheme failure probability) for a PFMs subset size
as the inverse of the available number of observable sets times the probability of obtaining
an observable set (as shown in Fig. 6.4). The probability of the mitigation scheme failure
against the PFMs subset size used for the PSSE is depicted in Fig. 6.5. The figure shows
that applying a smaller subset of PFMs reduces the probability of a successful attack, as it
allows a larger number of PFMs combinations to obtain the PSSE. The system operator,
however, does not need to be restricted to a specific PFMs subset size.
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6.6 Simulation Results
In this section, the robustness of the proposed scheme is tested against the shortcom-
ings of traditional approaches, as discussed in the previous section. In so doing, we will
calculate load shedding under disturbance conditions, through the usage of the PSSE-PF
module. The following scenarios are simulated in PSCAD/EMTDC using the IEEE 39 bus
New England system. The measures of system stability after incorporating load shedding
are defined in [116–118, 139]. Accordingly, system voltage at each bus as well as system
frequency are recorded and shown in the following scenarios to make sure they are within
the standard limits that achieve system stability.
6.6.1 Tripping of a Large Generator
In this scenario, the proposed scheme is used to relieve the system after tripping gen-
erator G1. Figure 6.6a shows the variations in system load versus the drop in system
generation due to the disturbance. The value of the initial mismatch is 1 pu, so this is
the amount of load to be shed in the first step when the frequency reaches the minimum
threshold (59.3Hz). Due to the transient which occurred after shedding the load, the
generation power drops slightly, necessitating a smaller second shedding step. The calcu-
lated mismatch value, illustrated in Fig. 6.6b, shows the accuracy of using the PSSE-PF
module to calculate it at different stages of the disturbance. It also shows that the power
mismatch is reduced to zero after the shedding process. As a result, the frequency of
center of inertia reverts to the nominal value, as depicted in Fig. 6.6c, which reflects the
frequency stability of the system after incorporating the proposed shedding scheme. In
addition, Fig. ?? shows the system voltage response at buses 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 31 and 32
during and after incorporating the load shedding. It can be seen that after incorporating
the proposed scheme, system voltage at each bus returns back to its normal value, which
achieves voltage stability as well.
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6.6.2 Islanding Scenario
This scenario includes a sudden load increase of 0.45 pu at bus 15 at t = 16 sec, resulting
in the disconnection of the transmission lines that connect buses 1-2 and 8-9 at t = 17 sec
due to thermal limits. Because of this disturbance, the system becomes two islands, with
one having an unbalance between load and generation due to being disconnected from the
system’s main supply. The system can be viewed as two areas: Area 1, which includes
buses 1, 9 and 39, and Area 2, which includes the rest of the system. An analysis of each
area is carried out separately below.
A. Analysis of Area 1
Area 1 includes the largest supply G1. However, as seen in Fig. 6.8a, the generation
is less than the load, and the rest of load power is taken from the generators in Area 2.
At the moment of disturbance, G1 is willing to participate in the load increase that occurs
in Area 2, so the output power of this generator increases. Following the disconnection of
the transmission line at t = 17 sec, Area 1 becomes isolated and includes only G1 and a
load of 1.15 pu. The frequency of Area 1 remains stable after the disturbance, as shown
in Fig. 6.8c, because the area power mismatch is zero (see Fig. 6.8b). Therefore, no load
shedding is needed in Area 1.
B. Analysis of Area 2
Area 2 experiences extra generation prior to the load increase that occurs at t = 16 sec.
This extra generation power is supplied to Area 1, as discussed above and as shown in Fig.
6.9a. After the transmission lines are disconnected, a mismatch of 0.15 pu exists in Area
2 (see Fig. 6.9b) because the generators in this area are not able to supply the entire
load demand. Hence, the system frequency begins to drop, as illustrated in Fig. 6.9c, and
reaches the load shedding threshold at t = 24 sec. A load shedding process then takes
place and the frequency of the area returns to its nominal value.
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It can be seen that the frequency in the two areas went back to the nominal value after
incorporating the proposed load shedding. In addition, Fig. 6.10 shows that the voltages at
selected buses recovers after the disturbance as well. Therefore, the values of both system
frequency and voltages achieve system stability.
6.7 Advantages of the Proposed WAUFLS Scheme
The results from the above analyses indicate that the approach of calculating a power
mismatch during a disturbance has several advantages compared to the swing equation
used in other schemes. These advantages include the following:
i. The calculated value of the power mismatch is trusted, regardless of the existence of
FDI in the power flow measurements, because the proposed approach uses trusted
system states to calculate it. In contrast, the calculated value using the swing equa-
tion could be inaccurate if there is an FDI on frequency measurements. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is more robust against cyber attacks.
ii. The proposed mitigation scheme uses a PSSE-PF module, which gives real-time
monitoring for the value of power mismatch due to the fact that PSSE is used in
almost all recent control centers to provide real-time monitoring of the system based
on the PMUs measurements that are being sent in high resolution. Nevertheless,
because of the dynamic response of governors, turbines, loads and other control
elements, the validity of the swing equation output is limited and considered only at
the moment of disturbance [105].
iii. The proposed mitigation scheme uses only the frequency magnitude to detect distur-
bances, which means it can work with any frequency signal from the system. This is
because the frequency magnitude at different points in the system is the same, with
only the ROCOF changing from point to point, as shown in Fig. 3.4. Afterwards, it
uses the system states, which are continuously available. The swing equation, on the
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other hand, uses both ROCOF and the frequency of center of inertia (fc) to calculate
the mismatch. The accuracy of the fc calculation depends on the number of available
frequency measurements, with higher measurements being more accurate. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is more reliable.
iv. The proposed approach is valid for large and small systems, whereas the approaches
that use the swing equation are valid only for large systems. Following a large
disturbance that includes tripping of the generators or large synchronous motors, the
swing equation does not give accurate results because it depends on the inertia of
the system. This can be approximated in large systems by assuming that most of
the total inertia is still available. However, for small systems, an underestimation of
the actual disturbance might result [102]. Therefore, the proposed scheme is more
accurate for a wider range of system sizes.
v. The proposed scheme calculates the power mismatch, which is the amount of load
to be shed directly, because it monitors the system online and runs power flow at
every time step. On the other hand, the swing equation calculates the magnitude
of disturbance, which still requires the control center operator to find and obtain
information about the available spinning reserve in order for a decision to be made
about the amount of load to be shed.
6.8 Summary
As a mitigation approach, a new WAUFLS scheme that works based on trusted mea-
surements was proposed. A PSSE-PF module was used to calculate the total system
mismatch. This module has two main components: the PSSE, which uses power flow mea-
surements and calculates trusted system states, and the power flow, which utilizes these
trusted states to determine the mismatch and hence the amount of load to be shed. Ac-
cordingly, the load shedding is distributed between the buses based on the proximity to the
disturbance according to their voltage dip during the disturbance. The proposed scheme
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was tested and validated under a range of system conditions. The results show that it is
able to protect the system during under-frequency conditions, regardless of the existence
of an FDI on system measurements. The results thus confirm the accuracy and reliability
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Figure 6.1: Flowchart of the proposed WAUFLS protection scheme
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Figure 6.2: Measurements classification into three essential sets

















Figure 6.3: PSSE iterations for required accuracy
117














































Figure 6.5: Failure probability of the mitigation scheme
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(a) Power generation vs. load power


























(c) Frequency of center of inertia
Figure 6.6: Load shedding after G1 tripping and the effects on power mismatch and frequency
values
119


























Figure 6.7: Voltage at selected buses
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(a) Power generation vs. load power
























(c) Frequency of center of inertia
Figure 6.8: Power mismatch and frequency of Area 1
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(a) Power generation vs. load power

























(c) Frequency of center of inertia
Figure 6.9: Power mismatch and frequency of Area 2
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7.1 Summary and Conclusions
Communication networks in smart grids are bringing increased connectivity to the en-
ergy industry, revolutionizing it in terms of reliability, performance, and manageability.
This is accomplished by providing bidirectional communications to operate, monitor, and
control power flow and measurements. However, communication networks also bring severe
security vulnerabilities. Because of their critical nature and the significant socioeconomic
impact of blackouts, smart grids can be a prime target for cyber terrorism. Cyber attacks
present a real threat to WAMPAC schemes. While cryptographic authentication mecha-
nisms, e.g., through the use of Message Authentication Codes (MAC), may enable us to
detect malicious modifications to sensor measurements, they do not prevent attackers from
modifying these data. Therefore, in smart grid applications that require real-time response,
such as WAMPAC schemes, real-time mitigation for cyber attacks is still required after
attack detection. The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized in the following
points:
• The analysis presented in this work demonstrated that current wide-area frequency-
related schemes are vulnerable to FDI attacks.
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• The effect of FDI attacks on AGC systems as well as WAUFLS protection schemes
was studied in detail. The problem formulation was driven mathematically and
simulations of FDI scenarios on practical systems were tested.
• An approach to detect FDI attacks on AGC using the Kalman filter was proposed.
System measurements were estimated using the filter and then compared with the
received ones. The norm of the residual as well as a CUSUM were used to decide on
the existence of an attack on the measurements. The results indicate that while the
proposed approach can detect FDI instantaneously, it cannot mitigate its effect.
• An approach to jointly detect, estimate and compensate for FDI attacks against
AGC systems was presented. The utilized input/state estimation-based algorithm
considered the FDI as an unknown input and estimated its value accordingly. The
estimated values for the FDI were then used to compensate for the effect of the attack
in real time so that the AGC system could continue its operation under attack until
the main reasons for the attack were eliminated. The simulation results confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed approach against different types of FDI attacks.
• An RNN-based approach for detecting the FDI in AGC systems was also proposed
that considered system nonlinearities. The RNN analyzed the sequential stream of
signals and built a memory of previous system states to detect any anomalies or
attacks on the signals. The results confirm RNN’s ability to detect, classify and
identify different types of attacks with high statistical measures within less than one
second of the attack.
• A new mitigation scheme that works based on trusted measurements was proposed
to mitigate the effect of FDI attacks on WAUFLS. A PSSE-PF module was used to
calculate the total system mismatch. This module has two main components: the
PSSE, which uses power flow measurements and calculates trusted system states,
and the power flow, which utilizes these trusted states to determine the mismatch
and hence the amount of load to be shed. The load-shedding is distributed between
the buses based on the proximity to the disturbance, according to their voltage dip
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during the disturbance. The proposed scheme was tested and validated under a
range of system conditions. The results show that it is able to protect the system
during under-frequency conditions, regardless of the existence of an FDI on system
measurements. The results thus confirm the accuracy, speed, and reliability of the
proposed scheme.
7.2 Directions for Future Work
More work can be done to address several key topics. These include novel methods
for risk assessment that capture cyber attack threats and impacts, and attack detection
and mitigation techniques that leverage cyber and physical properties of the grid without
interfering with its critical energy delivery functions. There are several potential directions
that could be pursued to extend the work discussed in this thesis. The following points
can be considered for future research:
• In general, the effect of cyber attacks on other WAMPAC can be given more con-
sideration. Since there is no general model that can represent the response of all
WAMPAC schemes, each scheme or each group of similar schemes should be dealt
with separately.
• The problem of cyber security of RAS schemes, including UVLS and OOS, should be
investigated in detail. Attack models on these schemes should be studied and defense
mechanisms should be proposed.
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Data of the AGC Systems
A.1 Parameters of the Two-Area System
Table A.1 shows the different parameters of the two-area AGC system used throughout
this work. These data are obtained from [65].
Table A.1: Parameters of the Two-Area System
Parameters Area 1 Area 2
Di (pu/Hz) 0.6 0.3
Hi (sec) 5 4
Ri (Rad/pu) 0.05 0.0625
KIi 0.3 0.3
TT i (sec) 0.5 0.6
Tgi (sec) 0.2 0.3
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A.2 Parameters of the Four-Area System
The 12-bus four-area (Fig 4.10) system used in this study is a practical system from
North America. The parameters for each area are taken from [126] and are summarized in
Table A.2.
Table A.2: Parameters of the Four-Area System
Parameters Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4
Kpi (rad/puMW) 76 141.7 139.6 114.2
Tpi (sec) 14.4 19.1 9.39 9.12
Ri (Hz/pu) 3 3 3 3
Bi (pu/Hz) 0.416 0.377 0.378 0.388
KIi 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131
TTGi (sec) 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
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Appendix B
Data of the IEEE 14-Bus System
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1 1 1.06 0 114.14-j16.9
2 1 1.045 21.7+j12.7 40
3 1 1.01 94.2+j19 0
4 0 – 47.8+j4 0
5 0 – 7.6+j1.6 0
6 1 1.07 11.2+j7.5 0
7 1 1.09 0 0
8 0 – 29.5+j16.6 0
9 0 – 9+j5.8 0
10 0 – 3.5+j1.8 0
11 0 – 6.1+j1.6 0
12 0 – 13.5+j5.8 0
13 0 – 14.9+j5 0
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From To Mag. Ang.
1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.02640 0 0
1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.02190 0 0
2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.01870 0 0
2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.02460 0 0
2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.01700 0 0
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.01730 0 0
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.00640 0 0
4 8 0 0.55618 0 0.969 0
5 6 0 0.25202 0 0.932 0
6 10 0.09498 0.1989 0 0 0
6 11 0.12291 0.25581 0 0 0
6 12 0.06615 0.13027 0 0 0
8 9 0.03181 0.0845 0 0 0
8 13 0.12711 0.27038 0 0 0
9 10 0.08205 0.19207 0 0 0
11 12 0.22092 0.19988 0 0 0
12 13 0.17093 0.34802 0 0 0
Table B.3: Detailed Model Unit Data









1 10.296 0 0.2995 0.646 0.8979 0.646 7.4 0 0.2396
2 13.08 0.0031 0.185 0.36 1.05 0.98 6.1 0.3 0
3 13.08 0.0031 0.185 0.36 1.05 0.98 6.1 0.3 0
4 10.12 0.0014 0.232 0.715 1.25 1.22 4.75 1.5 0.134
5 10.12 0.0014 0.232 0.715 1.25 1.22 4.75 1.5 0.134
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Table B.4: Detailed Model Unit Excitation System Data
Unit # KA TA VRMIN VRMAX Tr TE KF TF Ae Be
1 300 0.02 0 7.32 0.001 0.2 0.002 1 0.0006 0.9
2 20 0.02 0 4.38 0.001 1.98 0.001 1 0.0006 0.9
3 20 0.02 0 4.38 0.001 1.98 0.001 1 0.0006 0.9
4 20 0.02 1.395 6.81 0.001 0.7 0.001 1 0.0006 0.9
5 20 0.02 1.395 6.81 0.001 0.7 0.001 1 0.0006 0.9
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Appendix C
Data of the IEEE 39-Bus System
The single line diagram, bus data, line, generator and excitation system data are given in
the following pages. Data for the detailed model of the system are taken from [140]










1 0 – 0 0
2 0 – 0 0
3 0 – 322+j2.4 0
4 0 – 500+j184 0
5 0 – 0 0
6 0 – 0 0
7 0 – 233.8+j84 0
8 0 – 522+j176 0
9 0 – 0 0
10 0 – 0 0
11 0 – 0 0
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12 0 – 7.5+j88 0
13 0 – 0 0
14 0 – 0 0
15 0 – 320+j153 0
16 0 – 329+j32.3 0
17 0 – 0 0
18 0 – 158+j30 0
19 0 – 0 0
20 0 – 628+j103 0
21 0 – 274+j115 0
22 0 – 0 0
23 0 – 247.5+j84.6 0
24 0 – 308.6-j92.2 0
25 0 – 224+j47.2 0
26 0 – 139+j17 0
27 0 – 281+j75.5 0
28 0 – 206+j27.6 0
29 0 – 283.5+j26.9 0
30 1 1.0475 0 250+j0
31 1 0.982 9.2+j4.6 –
32 1 0.9831 0 650+j0
33 1 0.9972 0 632+j0
34 1 1.0123 0 508+j0
35 1 1.0493 0 650+j0
36 1 1.0635 0 560+j0
37 1 1.0278 0 540+j0
38 1 1.0265 0 830+j0
39 1 1.03 1104+j250 1000+j0
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From To Mag. Ang.
1 2 .0035 .0411 .6987 0 0
1 39 .0010 .0250 .7500 0 0
2 3 .0013 .0151 .2572 0 0
2 25 .0070 .0086 .1460 0 0
3 4 .0013 .0213 .2214 0 0
3 18 .0011 .0133 .2138 0 0
4 5 .0008 .0128 .1342 0 0
4 14 .0008 .0129 .1382 0 0
5 6 .0002 .0026 .0434 0 0
5 8 .0008 .0112 .1476 0 0
6 7 .0006 .0092 .1130 0 0
6 11 .0007 .0082 .1389 0 0
7 8 .0004 .0046 .0780 0 0
8 9 .0023 .0363 .3804 0 0
9 39 .0010 .0250 1.2000 0 0
10 11 .0004 .0043 .0729 0 0
10 13 .0004 .0043 .0729 0 0
13 14 .0009 .0101 .1723 0 0
14 15 .0018 .0217 .3660 0 0
15 16 .0009 .0094 .1710 0 0
16 17 .0007 .0089 .1342 0 0
16 19 .0016 .0195 .3040 0 0
16 21 .0008 .0135 .2548 0 0
16 24 .0003 .0059 .0680 0 0
17 18 .0007 .0082 .1319 0 0
17 27 .0013 .0173 .3216 0 0
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21 22 .0008 .0140 .2565 0 0
22 23 .0006 .0096 .1846 0 0
23 24 .0022 .0350 .3610 0 0
25 26 .0032 .0323 .5130 0 0
26 27 .0014 .0147 .2396 0 0
26 28 .0043 .0474 .7802 0 0
26 29 .0057 .0625 1.029 0 0
28 29 .0014 .0151 .2490 0 0
12 11 .0016 .0435 0 1.006 0
12 13 .0016 .0435 0 1.006 0
6 31 .0000 .0250 0 1.070 0
10 32 .0000 .0200 0 1.070 0
19 33 .0007 .0142 0 1.070 0
20 34 .0009 .0180 0 1.009 0
22 35 .0000 .0143 0 1.025 0
23 36 .0005 .0272 0 1 0
25 37 .0006 .0232 0 1.025 0
2 30 0 .0181 0 1.025 0
29 38 .0008 .0156 0 1.025 0
19 20 .0007 .0138 0 1.060 0









Table C.3: Detailed Model Unit Data









1 500.0 0 .006 .008 .02 .019 7.0 .7 .003
2 30.3 0 .0697 .170 .295 .282 6.56 1.5 .035
3 35.8 0 .0531 .0876 .2495 .237 5.7 1.5 .0304
4 28.6 0 .0436 .166 .262 .258 5.69 1.5 .0295
5 26.0 0 .132 .166 .67 .62 5.4 .44 .054
6 34.8 0 .05 .0814 .254 .241 7.3 .4 .0224
7 26.4 0 .049 .186 .295 .292 5.66 1.5 .0322
8 24.3 0 .057 .0911 .290 .280 6.7 .41 .028
9 34.5 0 .057 .0587 .2106 .205 4.79 1.96 .0298









Unit # 1 has constant excitation.
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Table C.4: Detailed Model Unit Excitation System Data
Unit # KA TA VRMIN VRMAX KE TE KF TF C1 C2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 6.2 .05 -1. 1.0 -.633 .405 .057 .5 .66 .88
3 5.0 .06 -1. 1.0 -.0198 .5 .08 1.0 .13 .34
4 5.0 .06 -1. 1.0 -.0525 .5 .08 1.0 .08 .314
5 40.0 .02 -10.0 10.0 1.0 .785 .03 1.0 .07 .91
6 5.0 .02 -1. 1.0 -.0419 .471 .0754 1.246 .064 .251
7 40.0 .02 -6.5 6.5 1.0 .73 .03 1.0 .53 .74
8 5.0 .02 -1.0 1.0 -.047 .528 .0854 1.26 .072 .282
9 40.0 .02 -10.5 10.5 1.0 1.4 .03 1.0 .62 .85
















Figure C.1: IEEE Type 1 rotating excitation system model
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